Science, Freedom of Conscience and the
Establishment Clause
Kyron Huigens*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1976, despairing over recent decisions which seemed to
"tilt the Constitution against religion," David Louisell was
driven to ask:
Of course we all know and acknowledge that the first
amendment precludes, and rightly so, preference for any
religious denomination. But is there not a core of common
religious understanding at the heart of American institutions--are we not in fact, as once proclaimed, "[a] religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being?" Is
there not something of a common denominator that sometimes is identified as America's civil religion?'
The answer is no. Justice Douglas's dictum is simply wrong.
The Constitution presupposes no Supreme Being, institutes no
particular truth and contemplates a legal order that is similarly open. The establishment clause 2 maintains constitutional
democracy on those terms by invalidating any encroachment
on freedom of conscience which religion wielding the power of
the state can devise.
This Article is an extended defense of that strong conception of the establishment clause. It is in part a reply to those,
like Louisell, who have argued that strict construction theories
of the clause "establish" something called "The Religion of
Secular Humanism."' It is in part an attack on the idea that
* Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Pierce County, Washington. J.D., Cornell Law
School, 1984; A.B., Washington University in St. Louis, 1981. The author wishes to
thank Jeffrey B. Chasnow, Richard F. Neidhardt, F. Ross Tilghman, and George R.
Nock for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. Louisell, Does the Constitution Require a Purely Secular Society?, 26 CATH.U.
L. REV. 20, 33 (1976) (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (Douglas, J.)).
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... U.S.
CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
3. See infra notes 153, 201-203 and accompanying text. See McGarry, The
Unconstitutionality of Exclusive Governmental Support of Entirely Secularistic
Education, 28 CATH. LAw. 1 (1983); Toscano, A Dubious Neutrality: The Establishment
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the establishment clause mandates accommodations of religion
beyond what the free exercise clause requires.4 It is in part an
attempt to dispel the confusion in the cases on which both of
those arguments rely.5 Above all, however, this article is an
attempt to give a definitive account of the liberal' conception
of the Constitution and the clause which apologists of religion
have decried for decades, but which has never played the role
of Secularism in the Public Schools, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV. 177 (1979); Whitehead &
Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion of Secular Humanism and its First
Amendment Implications, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1 (1978); Comment, Secularism in the
Law: The Religion of Secular Humanism, 8 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 329 (1981).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 264-90.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 89-111 and 315-49.
6. It is worth a few lines to defend this contentious idea. The Critical Legal
Studies [hereinafter CLS] movement has produced a large body of literature
purporting to have demolished the liberal conception of law. That body of work
presents a fundamental challenge to the analysis presented here. See M. KELMAN, A
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); THE POLITICS OF LAW (D. Kairys ed. 1982);
R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 29-144 (1975).
Only one point of the CLS critique bearing directly on my analysis is addressed in
the body of this article. The very notion of freedom of conscience rests on a liberal
conception of the individual as an autonomous being. The concept of the individual is
a favorite target of CLS scholars, as it has always been for anti-liberal theorists of the
left and right. See, e.g., R. UNGER, supra, at 228-29; Heller, Structuralism and
Critique, 36 STAN. L. REV. 127, 163-7 (1984). Notes 224, 225, 229, 230, and 231, infra,
form a more or less continuous essay responding to a leading criticism along these
lines advanced by Michael Sandel.
On a more general level, CLS critics claim to expose liberalism's reliance on a
naive epistemology consisting of an objective world, known directly and navigated with
neutral legal rules. Heller, supra, at 177; Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism
and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 7-8 (1984); Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical
Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575, 577-79 (1984). On the contrary,
however, liberalism has deep roots in pragmatism and radical empiricism, taking as it
does the incommensurability of competing discourses as its central problem. Rawls,
Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 225 (1985).
See J. DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE (1925); J. DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY
(1929); W. JAMES, ESSAYS IN RADICAL EMPIRICISM (1912). Not surprisingly, then,
CLS's epistemological critique of liberalism turns out to be an attack on a strawman.
Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARv. L. REV. 332, 352 n.75, 400 (1986);
Williams, CriticalLegal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New
Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 485-86 (1987).
In any event, this article, while liberal in orientation, by no means relies on a
naive epistemology. My thesis rests in part on the work of the philosopher Karl
Popper, who mounted an influential attack on logical positivism while Wittgenstein
was still a true believer. See infra notes 14, 151, 152 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, one of the clearest manifestations of liberalism's roots in pragmatism is
the role of coherence theories of truth in its leading formulations. Stick, supra at 363.
See R. WALKER, THE COHERENCE THEORY OF TRUTH (1989). The foremost example is
John Rawls's method of seeking considered opinion in reflective equilibrium. See
infra note 224. This article relies heavily on Rawls and shares his epistemological
premises. See infra text accompanying notes 219-31.
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in the cases which those apologists, in their anxiety, ascribe to
it.
Despite the fact that this article advances a strict construction of the establishment clause, I begin with a premise my
religious opponents share. In construing the establishment
clause, there is no refuge in the notion of neutrality. If science
is taught in public schools and religion is not, then the secular
has been preferred over religion. If one contends, as I do, that
the Constitution mandates that preference, then the preference must be justified.
On the assumption that we can take science as a paradigm
of the secular, I will argue that there is a deep congruence
between the scientific method and core constitutional values
which justifies granting secular ways of understanding preferential treatment over religious beliefs. Building on that congruence, this article will propose and defend a test of validity
under the establishment clause which is derived from an influential theory in the philosophy of science. The test is
grounded in the Constitution by its attention to a constitutional value which has been slighted in the establishment
clause cases: freedom of conscience. The proposed test provides that: Legislation or executive action is invalid under the
establishment clause when it has the effect of advancing belief
not falsifiable in principle.
There is no harm in admitting at the outset that my
account of the establishment clause bears little resemblance to
the current state of the law. The current state of the law
under the clause is chaos; something widely recognized.7
Accordingly, part II of this Article presents a diagnosis of
Lemon v. Kurtzman,' the case which framed the Court's cur7. L. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 128 (1986); Choper, The Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PrIT. L. REV. 673, 680-81
(1980); Cornelius, Church and State-The Mandate of the Establishment Clause: Wall
of Separation or Benign Neutrality?, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 8 (1984); Kurland, The
Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment and the
Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 15 (1978-79); Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the
FirstAmendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 847, 848
(1984); McCoy & Kurtz, A Unifying Theory for the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, 39 VAND. L. REV. 249, 252 (1986); Paulsen, Religion, Equality and the
Constitution: An Equal ProtectionApproach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 315 (1986); Smith, Symbols, Perceptions and Doctrinal
illusions: EstablishmentNeutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV.
266, 269 (1987); Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudenceof the
Religion Clauses, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 997, 997 (1986).

8. 403 U.S. 602 (1970).
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rent, inadequate, three part test.9 While dispelling some of the
confusion arising from Lemon might be good in itself, my main
purpose is to show how the flaws of Lemon, and the resulting
confusion, have been exploited by those Justices determined to
accommodate religion.1" I then identify a countervailing line of
cases which has been completely dominated by the accommodationist tradition.1 1 From that countervailing line of cases,
I derive my alternative test of validity under the establishment
clause.12
Part III examines the case of Edwards v. Aguillard,3 in
which the Court overturned Louisiana's statute requiring the
teaching of creationism. Issues of evidence, belief, faith and
science dominated Aguillard,and that case is the best means of
identifying that quality of religious belief which differentiates
it from other systems, like science, which do not offend the
establishment clause. I focus on Sir Karl Popper's definition of
science and his notion of falsifiability in principle. 4
Part IV lays out the fundamental conception of the Constitution on which the test of falsifiability rests.1 5 As I have indicated, it is a liberal Constitution. I recast the procedural
9. See infra text accompanying notes 22-88.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 89-99.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 100-12.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 113-24.
13. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 139-52. Karl Popper was born in Vienna in
1902, the son of an accomplished lawyer. He received his doctorate in psychology, but
abandoned that field soon after in favor of philosophy. He left Austria in the late
1930s, settling first in New Zealand and, after the war, in London. He taught at the
London School of Economics until 1969. He was knighted in 1965. The best critical
introduction to Popper is A. O'HEAR, KARL POPPER (1980).
Long before Wittgenstein did so, Popper rejected logical positivism and its dream
of "a system of absolutely certain, irrevocably true statements as the end and purpose
of science." K. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 37 (1959) [hereinafter K.
POPPER, LOGIC]; K. POPPER, LOGIK DER FORSCHUNG (1935). In this respect, Popper's
notion of falsifiability has a natural affinity with the deontological liberalism of John
Rawls. See J. Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral theory: The Dewey Lectures
1980, 77 J. PHIL. 515 (1980). Drawing out that affinity is one of the objects of this
article.
A comprehensive reformulation of liberalism on Popperian premises would be a
useful exercise, but it is not my purpose here. I intend only to adapt an isolated
element of Popper's thought-the notion of falsifiability in principle-to the problems
presented by the establishment clause. See infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text
and Part V. Popper himself drew largely the same connections between falsifiability,
the nature of political authority and pluralism. K. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS
ENEMIES (5th ed. 1966); K. POPPER, THE POVERTY OF HISTORICISM (2d ed. 1960). See A.
Ryan, Popperand Liberalism in POPPER AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES (Currie ed. 1985).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 166-216.
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Constitution described by John Hart Ely in Democracy and
Distrust as the deontological Constitution, arguing that the
Constitution rests on premises similar to those underlying
John Rawls's theory of justice. 6
In Part V, I draw together the notions of the deontological
Constitution and falsifiability in principle, establishing the fundamental connection between the establishment clause and
freedom of conscience."
Part VI applies the test of falsifiability to the cases, a process which subjects it to a useful strain and provides an opportunity to explicate its various elements.' 8 I then address two
outstanding issues in establishment clause theory in light of
the test: Justice O'Connor's "no endorsement" test 19 and the
validity of accommodations of religion not required by the free
exercise clause.20 Finally, I show how the test would treat the
major conflicts in the case law. 2 '
II.

A DIAGNOSIS OF LEMON V. KURTZMAN

In Lemon v. Kurtzman, Chief Justice Burger presented
the now familiar three-part test as a distillation of prior case
law.
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of
the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many
years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases.
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute
must not foster "an excessive governmental entanglement
22
with religion."
Given that the cases were already marked by inconsistencies
and flawed premises, the erratic results produced by the
Lemon test should have surprised no one. Nevertheless, the
criticism has been sharp. In practice, it has been said, the test
"means everything and nothing."23 Professor Kurland has
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See
See
See
See
See
See

infra
infra
infra
infra
infra
infra

text
text
text
text
text
text

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

notes
notes
notes
notes
notes
notes

166 & 190-99.
217-39.
240-65.
292-314.
267-90.
292-349.

22. 403 U.S. at 612-13.
23. Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L. J.

409, 450 (1986).
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called it nothing but "words, words, words."2 4 Professor Mansfield expanded on that sentiment by writing:
The principal fault with the Court's decisions under the religion clauses is their failure to come to grips with the fundamental philosophical questions that these clauses
inescapably present. More often than not the necessity of
confronting these questions is obscured by the incantation of
verbal formulae devoid of explanatory value .... That legis-

lation must not have as its "purpose" or "primary effect" the
aiding or inhibiting of religion, we have learned very well,
but by repeating these slogans we come no closer to understanding what is really at stake. The Court stultifies itself
by repeated use of these phrases.25
While largely accurate and motivated by an understandable
frustration, these comments mislead in suggesting that the
Lemon test is a purely arbitrary formula. The test is plainly
flawed, but its flaws have causes. The test was derived from
cases with their own history and logic, and it is there one must
look in order to understand the test's weaknesses.
A.

Everson and the Inversion of Purpose and Effect

The three prongs of Lemon are not of equal importance;
the effects prong is logically prior to both purpose and entanglements. Legislative purpose would be an irrelevant abstraction but for the fact that a legislature has the means to put its
intent into effect. Most invalidating entanglements are created
in vain attempts to avoid invalidating effects, a Catch-22 that
frequently has been commented on.26 This being the case, the
central defect of the Lemon test is not hard to discover. It is
that the Court has no clear idea what beneficial effect on religion it wishes to condemn or why.
Historically, the purpose and effect tests of Lemon are an
outgrowth of the "incidental benefits" theory promulgated in
Everson v. Board of Education-the first modern establishment clause case.
In Everson, the Court upheld a resolution
of a New Jersey school board which reimbursed parents of
24. Kurland, supra note 7, at 15.
25. Mansfield, supra note 7, at 848.
26. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 688 (White, J., concurring and dissenting); L. LEVY, supra
note 7, at 131.
27. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1947). Everson was the first case
to apply the establishment clause to the states via the fourteenth amendment. Id. at
15. Beyond that, several commentators have argued that it signalled the Court's
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Catholic school children for the cost of their children's travel
to and from Catholic schools on public busses. Justice Black
argued for the majority that the challenged resolution merely
provided a general benefit to all its citizens which incidentally
benefitted Catholic schoolchildren. He compared the transportation reimbursement to fire and police protection and access
to public utilities and concluded that the resolution was valid
because the establishment clause does not require the exclusion of parochial schools from general government benefits.2"
While we do not mean to intimate that a state could not provide transportation only to children attending public schools,
we must be careful, in protecting the citizens of New Jersey
against state-established churches, to be sure that we do not
inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from extending its general state law benefits to all its citizens without regard to
their religious beliefs. 29
The important thing to note in the Everson opinion is that
the Court's brief inquiry into effects was undertaken only for
the light it shed on legislative purposes.3 0 After determining
that the legislation's aiding religion was incidental to the legislature's main purpose, the Court never returned to the issue of
effects on religion per se. Effects were considered only insofar
as they indicated a legitimate purpose.
McGowan v. Maryland, decided fourteen years later,
upheld Maryland's Sunday closing laws, or "blue laws," on the
same incidental benefit theory.3 The opinion followed Everson's method: to discover a legitimizing legislative intent
behind the Sunday laws.3 2 The Court reasoned that, regardless
of their origin in Christianity, the laws currently were
intended to operate as health regulations, ensuring a day of
abandoning a preference for traditional theism in religion clause analysis. Comment,
supra note 3, at 342-43; Louisell, supra note 1, at 24.
28. 330 U.S. at 16-18.
29. Id. at 16.
30. Justice Jackson pointed out in dissent that the school board's resolution
explicitly included students attending Catholic schools and pointedly excluded those
attending other private and parochial schools. That pattern of conscious inclusion and
exclusion belied the notion that the benefit to the Catholic schools was merely
incidental. Id. at 20 (Jackson, J., dissenting). The critical point however is that both
Black and Jackson address only the question of legislative purpose, Jackson using
statutory construction and Black an evaluation of legislative purposes and the
legislative process.
31. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
32. Id. at 443-45.
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rest for the labor force.33 The Court noted the laws' substantial benefit to religion only to argue that it was incidental to
that purpose and therefore supported the conclusion that the
legislature had not acted with an illegitimate purpose.34
We do not hold that Sunday legislation may not be a violation of the "Establishment" Clause if it can be demonstrated
that its purpose-evidenced either on the face of the legislation, in conjunction with its legislative history, or in its operative effect-is
to use the state's coercive power to aid
35
religion.

The flaws in both Everson and McGowan are the Court's
exclusive concern with legislative purpose and its subordinating the distinct, and prior, question of effect to that inquiry.3
Under any plausible theory of judicial review, the Court is
entitled to strike down legislation not because the legislature
has an illegitimate intent-as if it were culpable and ought to
be punished by the frustration of its will-but because the legislation adversely affects interests protected by the Constitution and should therefore not be allowed to operate. As noted
above, legislative intent is relevant only because the legislature
presumably has the means to carry its intent into execution.
Effect, not purpose, is the key factor.
In Everson and McGowan, the Court betrays no recognition of this. The opinions treat the subject laws' effects on religion only as indicators of legislative intent, without returning
to the question of what adverse effects are likely to follow
from that intent once it is put into execution. Consequently,
the opinions shed no light at all on why certain effects are
unacceptable under the establishment clause. By the time
effects on religion was designated as a distinct inquiry, in
Abington v. Schempp,3 7 the Court was well on its way to chaos.
Relying on Everson and McGowan, the most one can say about
33. Id. at 445-49. The Court examined the statutory language and history
extensively. Despite references to the "Lord's day" and to "profan[ing] the Lord's
day," the laws had been reenacted a number of times, with an accretion of exceptions.
By 1960, the Sunday laws permitted the sale of tobacco and alcohol, the operation of
bathing beaches and amusement parks and the playing of pinball machines, slot

machines and bingo. These exceptions supported the inference that the legislature had
a legitimate secular purpose: rest for the labor force.
34. Id. at 431-34.
35. Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
36. In McGowan, the inversion is explicit. Id.
37. 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1962).
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any given effect is that it does or does not indicate an improper
legislative purpose-limited guidance, to say the least.
This flaw is especially clear in Board of Education v.
Allen, probably the most troublesome of all establishment
clause cases. 38 New York's Education Law, as amended in 1965,
required local public school administrators to lend textbooks to
all school children, including those in private, parochial
schools. 39 In Allen, the Court upheld the law against an establishment clause challenge.4 ° It reasoned that, since parochial
schools had a recognized role in providing secular education, 4 '
the legislature had a legitimate purpose in lending textbooks
on secular subjects. 42 The Court recognized that, as a practical
matter, this resulted in a benefit to the parochial schools, but
judged this a permissible incidental benefit.
Books are furnished at the request of the pupil and ownership remains, at least technically, in the state. Thus no
funds or books are furnished to parochial schools, and the
financial benefit is to parents and children, not to schools.
Perhaps free books make it more likely that some children
choose to attend a sectarian school, but that was true of the
state-paid bus fares in Everson and does not alone demonstrate an unconstitutional degree of support for a religious
institution.43
Once again, the Court treated the effects inquiry as a purely
secondary, subordinate means of exposing illegitimate legislative purposes.
The express purpose of § 701 was stated by the New York
Legislature to be furtherance of the educational opportunities available to the young. Appellants have shown us nothing about the necessary effects of the statute that is contrary
to its stated purpose. The law merely makes available to all
children the benefits of a general program to lend school
books free of charge.44
38. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1967). Leonard Levy writes, concerning
Allen and subsequent cases coping with it: "Sometimes the Justices make distinctions
that would glaze the minds of medieval scholastics." L. LEVY, supra note 7, at 128. See
infra text accompanying notes 80 & 316-322.
39. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 701 (McKinney 1967 Supp.).
40. 392 U.S. at 248.
41. Previously established in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
42. 392 U.S. at 247-48.
43. Id. at 243-44.
44. Id. at 243 (emphasis added).
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Thus, when Justice White concluded that the incidental
benefit to parochial schools did not "demonstrate an unconstitutional degree of support for a religious institution," he meant
that it was not so extreme or predominant as to indicate that
the legislature's stated purpose was a sham. He did not consider whether the effect, in and of itself, was so extreme as to
constitute an establishment.45
Relying on Everson and
McGowan, he treated the legislation's effect only as an indicator of fatal illegitimate intent. 46
The consequences of all this should be obvious. Because
Everson misconstrued the relation of purpose to effect, treating
effect merely as an indicator of purpose, it gave no content to
the critical notion of impermissible effects on religion. Even
more disastrously, its "incidental benefits" theory provided no
framework within which that analytical content could or
would ever develop. In addition, since legislative purpose can
be defined only by reference to actual effects, the purpose
inquiry too has remained empty, despite the fact that Everson
and progeny treated legislative purpose, rather than effect, as
the determining factor in establishment clause analysis. The
result is that Lemon's purpose and effects tests are perfectly
circular and perfectly empty.4 7
45. Justice White explicitly disavowed considering the actual effects of the statute
in practice, citing an inadequate record. Id. at 248.
46. This sort of reasoning persisted even after Abington and then Lemon explicitly
stated the effects test as an inquiry distinct from legislative purpose. In Committee for
Public Education v. Nyquist, for example, the Court invalidated cash grants and tax
credits to parochial school parents despite New York's argument that the benefit to
the school was indirect. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 781 (1973). The Court reasoned that the benefit's being indirect was not
sufficient to rebut the (unsupported) assumption that the legislature's purpose was to
advance the schools' mission.
Indeed, it is precisely the function of New York's law to provide assistance to
private schools, the great majority of which are sectarian. By reimbursing
parents for a portion of their tuition bill, the state seeks to relieve their
financial burdens sufficiently to assure that they continue to send their
children to religion-oriented schools.
Id. at 783. As in Everson, McGowan, and Allen, the Court's decision turned on bad legislative intent: the beneficial effect on religion was treated merely as an indicator of
that intent.
47. I will not concentrate on the weaknesses of Lemon's entanglement prong,
since they are peripheral to my argument. The difficulties have been well described
elsewhere. Choper, supra note 7, at 681-85. I will only note that Choper discredits
only two types of entanglement: administrative entanglements and the threat of
political divisiveness. Those two theories were advanced in Lemon at 403 U.S. 619-22 &
622-24, respectively. Lemon, however, advanced a third theory of entanglement which
Choper does not address: the threat of religious indoctrination by the state, or with
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Thus, much of the confusion commonly attributed to
Lemon is ultimately attributable to Everson. For example, the
most notorious of the many conflicts under the establishment
4"
clause is that between Allen and Meek v. Pittenger.
Allen
held, as noted above, that the state may lend books on secular
subjects to parochial schools.4 9 In Meek, however, the Court
determined that instructional equipment-globes, projectors,
and so on-could not be loaned on the same basis.'0 The result
is arrant nonsense, as described by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree:
For example, a State may lend to parochial school children
geography textbooks that contain maps of the United States,
but the state may not lend maps of the United States for use
in geography class. A State may lend textbooks on American colonial history, but it may not lend a film on George
Washington, or a film projector to show it in history class. A
State may lend classroom workbooks, but may not lend
workbooks in which the parochial school children write,
thus rendering them nonreusable.5 '
No one has yet seen a way to reconcile Allen and Meek, least of
all the Court itself. It frankly admitted as much in Wolman v.
Walter, pledging not to extend the "unique presumption" of
Allen.52 Allen, however, is a straightforward application of
Everson's "incidental benefits" theory: the ultimate, and
indefensible, root of the conflict.
Everson is also clearly to blame for the conflict between
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist 53 and Mueller v. Allen.' In both cases, a state reimbursed parochial school parents for tuition and expenses by
way of tax benefits. Nyquist invalidated the New York legislation, expressly rejecting the argument that the parents' intervening decisions concerning the use of the money negated the
benefit to religion.55 In Mueller, however, Justice Rehnquist
the support of the state. Id. at 615-19. That theory of entanglement, which is better
understood as an impermissible benefit to religion, is the subject of this article.
48. 421 U.S. 349 (1975). See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110-11 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); L. LEVY, supra note 7, at 136-38.
49. 392 U.S. at 248.
50. 421 U.S. at 366.
51. 472 U.S. at 110-11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
52. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 251-52 n.18 (1977).
53. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
54. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
55. 413 U.S. at 786.
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expressly relied on that ground in upholding the challenged
benefits. 6 Rehnquist distinguished Mueller from Nyquist by

contending that the Minnesota tax scheme provided benefits to
all private schools, not just parochial schools.5 7 Unlike the
New York scheme, the benefit to religion in Minnesota was
incidental, and therefore legitimate.
As we have seen, however, Everson's "incidental benefits"
theory is a non-sequitur. The premise is that the benefit is
incidental; the conclusion is that the legislation is valid under
the clause. All that follows from the premise, however, is that
the legislature has some legitimate purpose; that some
intended effects of the legislation are secular effects. The legislation might have still other effects which infringe on interests or values protected by the clause. If so, the benefit to
religion violates the clause, incidental or not.

B.

Zorach, the Established Church and Questions of
UncalibratedDegree

While Everson failed to frame the question of invalidating

effects adequately, it did identify one such effect: the creation
of an established church.5" Furthermore, the Court made it
clear in Everson and in subsequent cases that the clause prohibits more than an actual state church.
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person
to go to or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church-attendance or nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in
the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
59

versa.
56.
57.
58.
59.

463 U.S. at 399.
Id. at 398.
330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
Id. at 15-16.
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The theory implicit in Everson's oft-cited list is that each of the
forbidden practices is a substantial step toward full establishment.6 ° What has been missing from Everson and subsequent
cases, however, is a reliable scale on which to judge these steps
toward that illegitimate goal.
One year after Everson, in Illinois ex rel McCollum v.
Board of Education, the Court held that religious classes conducted on school premises during the school day, albeit by nonpublic employees, violated the establishment clause.6 ' Justice
Black wrote the opinion in bold strokes:
The operation of the state's compulsory education system
thus assists and is integrated with the program of religious
instruction carried on by separate religious sects. Pupils
compelled by law to go to school for secular education are
released in part from their legal duty upon the condition
that they attend the religious classes. This is beyond all
question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups to spread
their faith.6 2
In 1951, however, the Court backed away from McCollum's
broad formulation. The program at issue in Zorach v. Clauson 63 was slightly distinguishable from that in McCollum. Students whose parents so desired were released from classes to
receive religious instruction, as in McCollum, but the classes
were conducted off school premises. The Court found this distinction dispositive and upheld the program.' As the dissenters pointed out, this contradicted McCollum, since the
compulsory attendance laws of New York were used to provide
pupils for religious instruction, just as those of Illinois had
been.6 5 Justice Douglas argued for the majority, however, that
what McCollum had treated as a yes or no issue-Is there a
benefit to religion?-was a question of degree. 6
60. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1970) ("A given law might not establish
a state religion but nevertheless be one 'respecting' that end in the sense of being a
step that could lead to such establishment and hence offend the First Amendment.").
61. Illinois ex rel. McCollura.v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
62. Id. at 209-10.
63. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
64. Id. at 315.
65. Id. at 316-17 (Black, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 314. Amazingly, Justice Douglas cites McCollum for this proposition.
While the Court in McCollum declined to consider released time programs not
before

the Court, it did so apparently on the ground that to do so would violate the "case or

controversy" limitation on the Court's jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Far
from

78

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 13:65

This theory grants a generous license for aid to religion, as
was amply demonstrated in Walz v. Tax Commissioner.6 7 The
Court upheld New York's real estate taxation exemption for
properties used for religious worship-obviously an enormous
governmental benefit to religion. The opinion quotes Zorach
to the effect that "we are a religious people whose institutions
suppose a Supreme Being, '6 8 and that "[w]hen the state
encourages religious instruction . . .it follows the best of our

traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people ....",69 The opinion then proceeds to analyze the issue on
Zorach's premise: the legislation is invalid only to the extent it
threatens an actual establishment.7 0 There was no impermissible religious purpose, because "[w]e cannot read New York's
statute as attempting to establish religion. ' 71 There was no
impermissible beneficial effect because: "There is no genuine
72
nexus between tax exemption and establishment of religion.
The heart of the Walz opinion is the contention that if the tax
exemption were likely to lead to full establishment, it would
have done so already, given the long history of such exemptions: "Nothing in this national attitude toward religious tolerance and two centuries of uninterrupted freedom from
taxation has given the remotest sign of leading to an established church or religion ...."'
What the Zorach analysis ignores, however, is the fact that
full establishment is an extremely remote eventuality, even
saying that establishment clause questions are questions of degree, the McCollum
opinion states, at the very page cited by Douglas:
Separation means separation, not something less. Jefferson's metaphor in
describing the relation between Church and state speaks of a "wall of
separation," not of a fine line easily overstepped. The public school is at once
the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our
common destiny. In no activity of the state is it more vital to keep out divisive
forces than in its schools, to avoid confusing, not to say fusing, what the
Constitution sought to keep strictly apart. "The great American principle of
eternal separation"-Elihu Root's phrase bears repetition-is one of the vital
reliances of our Constitutional system for assuring unities among our people
stronger than our diversities. It is the Court's duty to enforce this principle in

its full integrity.
333 U.S. at 231.
67. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
68. Id. at 672 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. at 313).
69. Id. at 672 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. at 313-14 (emphasis omitted)).
70. Id. at 673.
71. Id. at 673.
72. Id. at 675.
73. Id. at 678.
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with aid on the order of property tax exemptions.7 4 Given that
full establishment is so unlikely, taking it as our ultimate stan-"
dard leaves us with no standard at all. The consequences are
twofold. First, the lack of a realistic, workable standard means
that, in practice, anything can be legitimized. There is no better illustration of this than Walz. Second, making judgments
of degree with no scale is an exercise in drawing arbitrary
lines. One legacy of Zorach has been repeated and chaotic
attempts to gauge questions of uncalibrated degree, based on
the extremely remote eventuality of an established state
church.
Lemon itself institutionalized the Zorach approach, stating
that the central inquiry of establishment clause analysis is the
degree to which the challenged legislation makes eventual
establishment of a church more likely.
A law may be one "respecting" the forbidden objective while
falling short of its total realization. A law "respecting" the
proscribed result, that is, the establishment of religion, is not
always identifiable as one violative of the Clause. A given
law might not establish a state religion but nevertheless be
one "respecting" that end in the sense of being a step that
could lead to such establishment and hence offend the First
Amendment.7 5
In the space of a few pages, however, the Court demonstrated
the incoherence of the Zorach approach. Lemon struck down
salary subsidies to parochial school teachers and reimbursements to parochial schools of the cost of secular instruction.7"
The Court distinguished Walz by concluding that, while property tax exemptions had not led to an established church, cash
payments to parochial schools and their teachers might do so.
[M]odern governmental programs have self-perpetuating and
self-expanding propensities. These internal pressures are
only enhanced when the schemes involve institutions whose
legitimate needs are growing and whose interests have substantial political support. Nor can we fail to see that in constitutional adjudication some steps, which when taken were
thought to approach "the verge," have become the platform
for yet further steps. A certain momentum develops in constitutional theory and it can be a "downhill thrust" easily set
74. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
75. 403 U.S. at 612 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 607.
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in motion but difficult to retard or stop.... The dangers are
in advance exactly
increased by the difficulty of perceiving
77
where the "verge" of the precipice lies.
This undermined Zorach's "question of degree" theory in
several ways. First, the idea that salary subsidies for school
teachers might lead to an established church where property
tax exemptions for churches had not is implausible on its face.
The argument certainly does nothing to enhance Zorach's intuitive appeal. Second, it is difficult to see why Lemon's reasoning on this point could not apply to the tax exemptions of
Walz. Granted that the tax exemptions had been in existence
for some time, their validation by the Court certainly gave
impetus to efforts to validate other aid to religion. Third, the
passage is a tacit admission that one cannot gauge the degree to
which any particular legislation advances the day a state
church is established. Part of the reason for this is the impact
of the Court's own decisions on the issue, but this is only an
exacerbating factor in an inherently vague situation. We do
not know "where the 'verge' of the precipice lies" because our
ultimate invalidating effect-full establishment-is too remote
to provide any realistic guidance in particular cases.
For example, in Tilton v. Richardson the Court validated a
federal statute which granted money to sectarian colleges and
universities for the construction of buildings limited to secular
uses.7" The Court found no invalidating effect, despite the fact
that the federal money obviously allowed the religious institutions to shift their own resources to sectarian uses. By creating
that ability, Congress extended a substantial benefit to religion. The plurality denied that the benefit was of sufficient
magnitude to violate the establishment clause, but offered no
coherent explanation why.7 9
Zorach, Walz and Lemon would frame the issue in Tilton
this way: Is enabling a church-affiliated college to shift funds
77. Id. at 624.
78. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
79. The only explanation offered relied on Everson's "incidental benefits" theory.
Construction grants surely aid these institutions in the sense that the
construction of buildings will assist them to perform their various functions.
But bus transportation, textbooks and tax exemptions all gave aid in the sense
that religious bodies would otherwise have been forced to find other sources
from which to finance these services. Yet all of these forms of governmental
assistance have been upheld. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947);
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra.
Id. at 679.
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to sectarian uses as likely as, or any more likely than, the salary subsidies of Lemon to lead to the establishment of a state
church? The honest answer is: Who can tell? Lemon's discussion of that effect in slippery-slope terms would imply that the
answer is yes, and that therefore the construction aid was invalid. Walz strongly suggests that the answer is no, which would
validate the legislation. Ultimately, however, no one can possibly say whether the benefit to religion at issue in Tilton might
lead to an established church. The ultimate invalidating effect
posited by Zorach, full establishment, is simply too remote to
serve as a guide.
To return to the example of Meek and Allen, Justice Stewart prefaces Meek's bald contradiction of Allen with an appeal
to Zorach, as if its "question of degree" approach were an
excuse for, not the cause of, the inconsistency. 0 If Meek and
Allen can be reconciled as a matter of degree, however, the difference in the respective benefits to religion provided by books
and instructional materials is too fine for most to discern.
Similarly, Professor Choper's objection that Meek and
Wolman are inconsistent can be traced primarily to the incoherence of Zorach. The Court in Meek held that Pennsylvania
could not provide "auxiliary services"-defined as remedial
and accelerated instruction, guidance counseling and speech
and hearing services- on parochial school premises, regardless
of the fact that the persons providing the services were
employees of the state."1 In Wolman, the Court approved similar Ohio programs on the ground that, with the exception of
speech and hearing diagnosis, the services were provided off
parochial school premises.8 2 Professor Choper finds the on/off
premises distinction trivial, given that the services approved in
Wolman were provided in a mobile unit adjacent to the parochial school.8"
According to Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in
Wolman, services provided on school premises were more
likely to advance the religious message of the school.
The fact that a unit on a neutral site on occasion may serve
only sectarian pupils does not provoke the same concerns
that troubled the Court in Meek. The influence on a thera80.
81.
82.
83.

Meek, 421 U.S. at 359.
Id. at 367-72.
433 U.S. 229, 241-48 (1977).
Choper, supra note 7, at 681.
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pist's behavior that is exerted by the fact that he serves a
sectarian pupil is qualitatively different from the influence
of the pervasive atmosphere of a religious institution. The
dangers perceived in Meek arose from the nature of the
4
institution not from the nature of the pupils.8
Choper's objection stems from his refusal to accept this rationale at face value, and on one level this is understandable.
While Justice Blackmun's distinction seems perfectly clear in
isolation, what is not clear is how it fits with the establishment
clause doctrine dominated by Zorach. Does the reduced danger of indoctrination in Wolman as opposed to Meek indicate
that Ohio's program was less likely to lead to an established
church than Pennsylvania's? Why? The answer would evidently require an excursion into mass psychology that the
Court has never been prepared to make.
On another level, however, Choper's objection (if I have
read it properly) is disingenuous. What real force is there in
objecting that Blackmun's distinction is not well founded in
the cases? The method of Zorach, institutionalized in Lemon,
is insupportable on its own terms. It casts establishment clause
analysis as a question of degree without providing any scale on
which to make such a judgment other than the extremely
remote eventuality of an established church. If Justice Blackmun's distinction in Wolman is implausible because it does not
fit well with Zorach, it is certainly worth considering whether
Zorach is not the source of the difficulty.
The contradictions between Walz and Nyquist,"5 Tilton
and Nyquist 8 and McGowan and Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,
Inc. 7 make that idea all the more credible. In each set, the
84. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 247-48.
85. Professor Paulson has argued that Walz cannot be reconciled with Nyquist.
Paulson, supra note 7, at 316. In Nyquist, the Court overturned a system of tax credits
and tuition grants to low income residents designed to relieve the financial burden of
parents whose children attended non-public schools. 413 U.S. at 798. It makes no
sense to conclude that small credits and grants to individuals have too great a religious
"effect" while permitting much larger tax benefits to go directly to churches.
86. Tilton and Nyquist are strikingly inconsistent. The latter struck down a
program to assist in the maintenance and repair of paroclhial schools, while the former
upheld a construction program for sectarian colleges. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, 689 (1971); Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 779.
87. In McGowan, the Court approved Maryland laws requiring all businesses to
close on Sunday, 366 U.S. at 452, and in Thornton the Court overturned a law
permitting each worker to choose his own Sabbath.
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,
Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985). The Thornton Court condemns the Connecticut law
particularly on the ground that: "the statute provides for no special consideration if a
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Court has approved the greater benefit to religion and condemned the lesser.' The reason, of course, is that Zorach
requires the Court to treat establishment clause questions as
questions of uncalibrated degree-an approach ensuring
inconsistency.
C. The Exploitationof Everson and Zorach
Not surprisingly, the incorporation of Everson and Zorach
in the Lemon test led to chaos. Much of the criticism of
Lemon concentrates exclusively on these conflicting results.8 9
If one stops short of examining Lemon's roots in Everson and
Zorach however, it is easy to misjudge the true depth of the
conflict in the cases. While the analytical poverty of Everson
and Zorach would have led inevitably to some incoherence, the
establishment clause has been damaged far more by their
active exploitation by those Justices disposed to aid religion.
For example, Zorach was the dominant force in Justice
Burger's opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.9 In Lynch, the Court
validated Pawtucket, Rhode Island's practice of maintaining a
creche during the Christmas season. From the outset, Justice
Burger portrayed the establishment clause as affirmatively
mandating the accommodation of religion, on the ground that
Americans are, as Justice Douglas alleged, "a religious people."9 The influence of Zorach extends well beyond this dicta,
high percentage of an employer's work-force asserts rights to the same Sabbath." 472
U.S. at 709. In McGowan, in contrast, the Court permitted the state to declare the
majority religion's Sabbath a Sabbath for the entire work force. 366 U.S. 420, 451
(1961).
88. Less egregious, but still incompatible are the results in Lemon, Mueller, and
Allen.
The Court has found it unconstitutional for a state to reimburse private
religious schools for the cost of textbooks and instructional materials, but
constitutional for a state to permit parents of children attending private
schools to take a tax deduction for the same expenses or for the state to loan
the textbooks directly to the students.
Paulsen, supra note 7, at 316. In each instance, the benefit to the parochial school is
more or less the same, and it seems reasonable to expect that the results of the cases
would also be more or less the same.
89. See supra note 7.
90. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
91. Id. at 675 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)). Justice Burger
also writes, having noted Congressional and executive proclamations concerning
religion:
One cannot look at even this brief resume without finding that our history is
pervaded by expressions of religious beliefs such as are found in Zorach.
Equally pervasive is the evidence of accommodation of all faiths and all forms
of religious expression, and hostility toward none. Through this
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however. A critical premise of Lynch is Zorach's notion that
legislation is invalid only if it sufficiently increases the likelihood of actual establishment.
Rather than mechanically invalidating all governmental conduct or statutes that confer benefits or give special recognition to religion in general or to one faith--as an absolutist
approach would dictate-the Court has scrutinized challenged legislation or official conduct to determine whether,
in reality, it establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends
to do so. 92 (citations omitted)
Justice Burger's own sarcastic dismissal of the very idea that
an establishment was threatened in Lynch betrays the emptiness of Zorach's standard:
The Court has acknowledged that the "fears and political
problems" that gave rise to the Religion Clauses in the 18th
Century are of far less concern today. We are unable to perceive the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishop of Rome, or
other powerful religious leaders behind every public
acknowledgment of the religious heritage long officially recognized by the three constitutional branches of government.
Any notion that these symbols pose a real danger of establishment of a state church is farfetched indeed. 93
At the same time, the result in the case vividly demonstrates
the utility of Zorach in extending aid to religion.
Justice Rehnquist, like Justice Burger, has recognized the
accommodation, as Justice Douglas observed, governmental action has
"follow[ed] the best of our traditions" and "respect[ed] the religious nature of
our people." 343 U.S. at 314.
Id. at 677-78.
92. Id. at 678 (citation omitted).
93. Id. at 686 (citation omitted). In the second creche case, County of Allegheny v.
A.C.L.U., 109 S.Ct. 3086 (1989), the Court disregarded the Burger opinion in favor of a
"no endorsement" analysis based on Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch. Id. at
3101-3105; id. at 3124-25 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 3126 (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy, in dissent, objected to that
abandonment. Id. at 3141 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). His application of Lynch shows
the reason: the boundless promise of the Zorach approach in accommodating religion.
Crucial to the Court's conclusion [in Lynch] was not the number, prominence,
or type of secular items contained in the holiday display but the simple fact
that, when displayed by government during the Christmas season, a creche
presents no realistic danger of moving government down the forbidden road
toward an establishment of religion. Whether the creche be surrounded by
poinsettias, talking wishing wells, or carolers, the conclusion remains the
same, for the relevant context is not the items in the display itself but the
season as a whole.
Id. at 3140.
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possibilities inherent in Zorach's logic. By combining Zorach
with Everson's "incidental benefits" theory, Justice Rehnquist
gave a virtuoso performance in the art of accommodating religion in his majority opinion in Mueller v. Allen.9 4 The Court
upheld a Minnesota program of tax credits to parents of parochial school children. First, Justice Rehnquist accepted the
state's asserted secular purpose of ensuring a proper education
for its citizens. 95 Having validated the purpose, he then
inquired into effects only so far as it might indicate a sham
purpose. He concluded that the Minnesota legislature's purpose-unlike New York's in Nyquist-was not a sham because
the benefit to the parochial schools was only incidental to Minnesota's broad-based program of deductions for charitable
donations.9 6 The utility of Everson for one disposed to favor
religious aid had never been so amply demonstrated.
Justice Rehnquist then demonstrated conclusively that the
threat of an established church provides no scale whatever
upon which permissible and impermissible effects might be
gauged. Fully exploiting Zorach, he confined the effects
inquiry to the likelihood of the tax credit's leading to the
actual establishment of a state church.
Not surprisingly, he
found that danger remote. "The historic purposes of the Clause
simply do not encompass the sort of attenuated financial benefit, ultimately controlled by the private choices of individual
parents, that eventually flows to parochial schools from the
neutrally available tax benefit at issue in this case. '"98 Justice
Rehnquist then determined that the possible entanglements
were not greater than those permitted in Allen and declared
the Minnesota tax credits valid. 99
The exploitation of Everson and Zorach in the service of
government aid to religion is deplorable in itself, but even
more troublesome is the deep rupture Mueller, Lynch, and
Marsh v. Chambers1 0 0 opened in establishment clause doctrine.
94. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
95. Id. at 394-95.
96. Id. at 398-99.
97. Id. at 399-400.
98. Id. at 400.
99. Id. at 403-04.
100. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). In Marsh, the Court upheld the practice of opening daily
sessions of the Nebraska legislature with a prayer. While Chief Justice Burger
pointedly refused to apply the Lemon test in Marsh, it was no great loss. The Mueller
opinion surely could have served as the model for an accommodating application of
Lemon. Given the analytical emptiness of the purpose and effect tests, Lemon posed
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Consider Engel v. Vitale' and Abington v. Schempp, 0 2 which
invalidated Bible reading and prayer in schools respectively.
The cases embody a condemnation of religious indoctrination
which even the accommodationist members of the Court have
accepted and asserted. °3 When reexamined in light of Everson,
Zorach, Mueller, Marsh and Lynch, however, Engel and Abington seem more isolated and oddly reasoned than unquestionably correct.
In Engel, the Court overturned a New York school board
regulation requiring the recital of the "Regents' Prayer" before
each school day. 0 4 The Court began by noting the important
role of the Book of Common Prayer in the established Church
of England. That very establishment played a leading role in
forming a strong movement to disestablishment in the states,
sentiment that Jefferson crystallized in the "Virginia Bill for
Religious Freedom" and Madison in his "Memorial and
Remonstrance.' ' 1°5 The danger of religious persecution following on the establishment of a state church was, above all, the
motivating force behind the establishment clause. 10 6 Even a
slight step toward an establishment, the Court argued, was sufficient to violate the clause:
To those who may subscribe to the view that because the
Regents' official prayer is so brief and general there can be
no danger to religious freedom in its governmental establishment, however, it may be appropriate to say in the words of
James Madison, the author of the first amendment: "[I]t is
proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our
10 7
liberties."'
One year later, the Court made the same argument in Abington, in which it struck down programs of classroom Bible reading.'0 Abington too recited the history of English and early
American establishments and cited the resulting evil of persecution as the danger justifying the establishment clause.' 9
no greater an obstacle to Nebraska's legislative prayer than it did to Minnesota's tax
credits.
101. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
102. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
103. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2581 (1988).
104. 370 U.S. at 436.
105. Id. at 425-30.
106. Id. at 429-30.
107. Id. at 436.
108. Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226-27 (1963).
109. Id. at 212-14.
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Further, it is no defense to urge that the religious practices
here may be relatively minor encroachments on the First
Amendment. The breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too soon become a raging torrent and, in
the words of Madison, "it is proper
to take alarm at the first
1 0°
experiment on our liberties."'
Reading Engel and Abington, it is easy to feel persuaded
that any benefit to religion is unacceptable as a "first experiment on our liberties." It is impossible to deny, however, that
that strict rule was unfounded at the time and was never fully
implemented afterward. Not only has the Court always been
content to allow substantial state benefits to religious institutions, the Zorach approach-treating the matter of effects as a
question of uncalibrated degree-has had a far greater influence than the strict "first experiment" theory. Everson's incidental benefit theory is, of course, flatly inconsistent with the
"first experiment" approach, but it too has overshadowed
Engel and Abington.
In sum, Everson and Zorach-the roots of Lemon-pose
two difficulties. First, they have led to confusion in the cases
directly through their own incoherence. Second, they have led
to an even deeper rift in establishment clause doctrine by providing a vehicle for validating virtually any aid to religion. In
this role, they have run up against the countervailing tradition
of Engel and Abington. The inconsistency between Meek and
Wolman cited by Professor Choper is one example of this.'1 '
Justice Blackmun's distinction between the danger of religious
indoctrination on and off parochial school premises does not fit
Zorach's mold because it was formed by Engel and Abington."2
In order to formulate an adequate alternative to Lemon,
clearly it is first necessary to escape Everson and Zorach. The
most promising route should be obvious: via Engel and
Abington.
D.

Freedom of Conscience and Invalidating
Effects on Religion

The hidden strength of Engel and Abington is closer to the
surface in a third case which shares their "first experiment"
premises. In Epperson v. Arkansas, the court overturned a law
110. Id. at 225.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
112. See inifra text accompanying notes 329-33.
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prohibiting the teaching of the theory of evolution. 1 13 Justice
Fortas's opinion for the majority cites Everson and McCollum,
Engel and Abington and concludes that: "These precedents
inevitably determine the result in the present case."" 4 So they
do. Except for Everson, which is cited only for its broad statement of principles, the cases Fortas cites embody the strict separation approach: they recite the dangers of persecution which
accompany an established church and then condemn the subject legislation as a "first experiment upon our liberties."
It should not be surprising, then, to note that Fortas supplements his argument. He alludes to other effects of legislation not usually drawn into establishment clause analysis.
First, Justice Fortas quotes Watson v. Jones to. this effect:
"The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of
no dogma, the establishment of no sect.""' 5 Next, discussing
the propriety of reviewing school curricula, he quotes Keyishian v. Board of Regents for the rule that the first amendment "does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over
the classroom.""' 6 Finally, before addressing the establishment
clause squarely, Fortas notes Meyer v. Nebraska, in which the
court overturned a criminal prohibition on teaching in languages other than English using substantive due process
analysis." 7
While Fortas disavows the "broad premise" of Meyer's substantive due process approach," 8 and while none of the cases
he cites belongs to the body of establishment clause precedent,
his raising those cases is neither an oversight nor a pointless
excursion. Consider this passage from Meyer:
In order to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled the males at seven into barracks and
intrusted their subsequent education and training to official
guardians. Although such measures have been deliberately
approved by men of great genius, their ideas touching the
113. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
114. Id. at 107.
115. Id. at 104 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 728 (1871)). In Watson, the
Court declined to decide which of two factions were the lawful elders and trustees of
the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church.
116. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 105 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 603 (1967)). In Keyishian, the Court invalidated, on vagueness and overbreadth
grounds, New York legislation prescribing a loyalty oath for teachers in higher
education.
117. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 105, (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
118. Id. at 105-06.
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relation between individuals and the state were wholly different from those upon which our institutions rest; and it
hardly will be affirmed that any legislature could impose
such restrictions upon the people of a state without doing
violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution.1 19

By citing and quoting Watson, Keyishian and Meyer, Fortas
suggests an invalidating effect on religion other than the ten-

dency toward full establishment. He suggests that orthodoxy,
indoctrination and conformity-in themselves, and not merely
as features of an establishedchurch-areeffects of government
action which it is the function of the establishment clause to
prevent.
This is no more than a suggestion in the opinion, and
Epperson is almost unique among establishment clause cases in
making it. 120 There are some obvious reasons why this is so.
Given the historical origins of the establishment clause as a
response to established churches, one seems to be on firmer
ground in treating orthodoxy, indoctrination and conformity as
secondary effects of establishment, and establishment itself as
the evil to be prevented. Furthermore, protecting free inquiry
is ordinarily thought of as a function of the free speech
clause. 12 Indeed, the trial court in Epperson invalidated the
119. 262 U.S. at 402. Justice McReynolds also quotes Plato to make his point:
For the welfare of his Ideal commonwealth, Plato suggested a law which
should provide: "That the wives of our guardians are to be common, and no
parent is to know his own child nor any child his parent ....
The proper
officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold, and
there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a separate
quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when they chance to
be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious, unknown place, as they
should be."
Id. at 401-02.
120. An exception is Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), in
which Justice Brennan noted that:
[Religious] indoctrination, if permitted to occur, would have devastating
effects on the right of each individual voluntarily to determine what to believe
(and what not to believe) free of any coercive pressures from the state.
Id. at 385. However, Ball has proven no more influential on this point than Epperson.
Furthermore, Brennan cites Zorach in support of this argument. Zorach's concern
with freedom of conscience lapses where the legislation ceases to threaten an established church. Despite the firmness of Brennan's pronouncement, Zorach undermines
it, just as it has undermined the role of freedom of conscience in establishment clause
analysis generally.
121. See West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640-42 (1943) (Jehovah's
Witnesses may not be compelled to salute the flag); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705
(1975) (Jehovah's Witness may not be compelled to carry the message "Live Free or
Die" on his automobile license plate).
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Arkansas law on free speech grounds. 122 Giving the establishment clause a role in guarding against incursions on free
inquiry may seem superfluous.
Still, it remains true that religious conviction has produced
threats to free inquiry which are distinctive, and that those
threats are often far removed from the actual establishment of
a state church. The Court's unequivocal reaction to remote
threats of full establishment in Engel, Abington and Epperson-and later in Stone v. Graham123 -is

in itself an indication

that this is so. In addition, the doctrinal isolation of those cases
suggests that they carry out an establishment clause function
which is distinct from countering the threat of a state church,
the focus of Zorach.
That distinct function of the clause is this: to protect freedom of conscience. The establishment clause serves to bar government's advancing dogmatic belief, not because dogma is the
product of an established church or because it might lead to
persecution, but for reasons having to do with dogma itself.
Epperson suggests the following definition of an invalidating
effect under the clause: Legislation or executive action is
invalid under the establishment clause if it has the effect of
advancing dogmatic belief.
One objection to this test has to do with the term
"dogma". 2 4 It is both too imprecise and too weighted with derision to serve a useful purpose in constitutional analysis. It conveys nothing concerning the underlying justification for
invalidation under the establishment clause. If we are to get at
the meaning of Engel and Abington-to define an invalidating
effect on religion based on something other than the remote
likelihood of a state church-we must find a precise, descriptive definition of the invalidating effect. Supplying that gap is
the purpose of the next part of this Article.
III.

DOGMA AND SCIENCE IN EDWARDS V. AGUILLARD

Edwards v. Aguillard presented the Court with an establishment clause challenge to the "Balanced Treatment for Cre122. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 100 & n.4 (1968).
123. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
124. Other objections also suggest themselves, and are dealt with in later pages.
Regarding my use of the term "advance," see text accompanying notes 254-65.
Regarding my use of the term "belief," see note 247. Regarding the possibility the test
requires hostility to religion, see text accompanying notes 273-90.
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ation-Science and Evolution Science in Public School
Instruction" Act (the Creationism Act or the Act.)' 2 5 The
Court concluded that Louisiana's stated secular purpose was a
sham, and invalidated the Act. 126 In order to develop the adequate substitution for dogma which my proposed definition of
invalidating effects on religion requires, I propose to examine
the case as a philosopher of science might.
A.

The Failingsof Everson in the Aguillard Opinion

The Act required that the teaching of the theory of evolution in Louisiana schools be balanced by the teaching of "creation science." If either were taught, the Act required that both
be taught.'2 7 "Creation Science" was defined in the Act as "the
scientific evidences for [creation] and inferences from those scientific evidences.' 12 The stated purpose of the Act was to
enhance academic freedom.' 2 9 As the title of the Act indicated,
this goal was to be served by providing "balanced treatment"
for creationism in the science curriculum. The legislative history showed, ultimately to the Act's downfall, that the Act
arose out of a perception on the part of its supporters that the
teaching of science in the public schools filtered out evidence
challenging the prevailing evolutionary view of the origins of
life. 3 ° It was to prohibit this censorship and to counteract the
bias of the scientific establishment that the Act required Louisiana schools to "balance" the teaching of evolution with the
teaching of "creation-science."''
Aguillard presented a singular challenge to the Court.
The Creationism Act's supporters, by design or intuition,
drafted the Act and crafted its legislative history in a way
which played to the weaknesses of existing establishment
clause case law. The text of the Act rigorously avoids any
overt identification of creation science with religion, and plausibly presents it as concerning only science and education. The
legislature also succeeded, for the most part, in confining the
debate on the Act to the merits of creationism as a scientific
theory and the propriety of legislating in matters of science
125. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.1-17:286.7 (West 1982).
126. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-94 (1987).
127. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.4A (West 1982).
128. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.3(2) & .3(3) (West 1982).
129. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.286.2 (West 1982).
130. 482 U.S. at 593.
131. 1 Joint Appendix E60-62, Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
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and science education.3 2 By framing the Act in this way, Louisiana made the doctrine of Genesis incidental to science
instruction, the better to take advantage of the opening provided by Everson.
In writing for the majority, Justice Brennan all but
walked into the trap. The Aguillard opinion is, on its surface,
a straightforward application of the Lemon v. Kurtzman
test. 3 3 The Creationism Act clearly grew out of a long, intractable debate between the proponents of creationism and the
That debate, which the Court could
proponents of evolution.'
not ignore, strongly indicated that the teachings the legislature
sought to bring into competition were not two scientific theories, but, simply, science and religion.
These same historic and contemporaneous antagonisms
between the teaching of certain religious denominations and
the teaching of evolution are present in this case. The preeminent purpose of the Louisiana legislature was clearly to
advance the religious viewpoint that a supernatural being
created humankind. The term "creation science" was
defined as embracing this particular religious doctrine by
those responsible for the passage of the Creationism Act.
Senator Keith's leading expert on creation science, Edward
Boudreaux, testified at the legislative hearings that the theincluded belief in the existence of a
ory of creation science
135
supernatural creator.
In short, the Court concluded that the Act lacked a secular
purpose because its stated purpose was a sham.
The Aguillard opinion's sham theory is a variation on the
incidental benefits theory of Everson. A legislature's purpose
is not a sham if the effect of promoting religion is truly incidental, and vice versa. The effect of teaching creationism was
not truly incidental, so the Act's stated purpose was a sham. In
Aguillard, Everson reached its logical nadir: in striking down
the Act, Justice Brennan framed the issue as one of sham secu132. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.286.2, 17.286.3 & 17.286.4 (West 1982). Some
witnesses did express religious sentiments in the course of testifying in favor of the
bill. Nick Kalivoda, for example, argued that science educators favored a theory of
evolution, "because we do not have to think about a creator and what our
responsibility is to Him." 1 Joint Appendix, at E82-83. However, the reason given for
supporting the Act was, in virtually all cases, a desire to present "scientific" evidence.
133. 482 U.S. at 584-86.
134. Id. at 589-90.
135. Id. at 591.
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lar purpose without seriously considering what a legitimate
secular purpose is to begin with.
In other words, Aguillard demonstrates how Everson's
failure to address the question of effects directly ensured that
the purpose prong too would remain empty. 3 ' Justice Scalia
exploits the emptiness of the purpose prong in his dissent, but
he, too, fails to reach the real issue. Perhaps, Justice Scalia
argues, if a trial court were to find that there is no genuine scientific evidence to support creationism, the Court would be
justified in concluding that "creation-science" is a cloak for the
Biblical tale of creation. On the record before the Court, however, the majority's reasoning simply assumes that there is no
37
such evidence.1
However, Justice Scalia does not fully articulate the problem. If the case had been remanded, what standard would the
trial court have used to distinguish genuine scientific evidence
from sham scientific evidence? How and why would that distinguish a genuine secular purpose from a sham secular purpose? Why would a sham secular purpose violate the
establishment clause? Answering those questions calls for a
clear idea of what beneficial effects on religion are impermissible under the establishment clause, and why. Even if Louisiana
had engaged in a sham, the Act was unconstitutional, if at all,
because if put into operation it would have had effects prohibited by the Constitution. Legislative purpose is relevant only
because the legislature has the means to put its will into effect.
The question is, what was the illegitimate effect of the Creationism Act?
While sham secular purpose analysis is unable to answer,
or even properly raise, that question, Justice Brennan's
approach does contain a kernel of insight. There is something
about the secular that ensures consistency with the Constitution. A better idea of what that something is, and why it was
lacking in the Creationism Act, may help the effort to define
invalidating illegitimate effects. In seeking the special quality
of the truly secular, it is only natural to begin by examining
the paradigm of the secular: science. A better understanding
of what makes science science will enable us to abandon completely the notion of a sham secular purpose and to escape the
flawed incidental benefits theory from which it grew.
136. See supra text accompanying note 47.
137. 482 U.S. at 619-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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B. Popperand Falsifiabilityin Principle
The creationists thought of scientific knowledge as a set of
results, called facts. They asserted a set of facts, different from
the scientific establishment's, which they claimed could be supported by scientific means. Since their facts were therefore
"just as good as evolution's," they demanded and won, briefly,
s
13
the right to have their facts taught in the public schools.
One of the reasons Justice Brennan's argument fails is
that he shares the creationists' premise that science is a set of
facts. Throughout his opinion, he treats religion and science as
mutually exclusive sets of beliefs, and assumes that individual
beliefs can be identified as religious or scientific. It is just this
content-based conception of science which led Justice Brennan
to perpetuate Everson's flawed approach. It gave him a convenient device for separating true from sham science, and, he
assumed, true from sham secular purposes.
Ironically, the flaw in Justice Brennan's argument is the
same as that in the creationist's arguments in favor of the Act:
science is not a collection of facts. The distinguishing mark of
science as an intellectual system is its method, not its results.
This can best be explained by reference to the work of Sir Karl
Popper, who for many years was primarily concerned with
139
drawing the line between science and psuedo-science.
Even after one abandons the notion that science is a set of
facts, the nature of its method is easily misunderstood. Science
is empirical and inductive, and it is ordinarily thought that the
scientist begins with observations, in which he discovers patterns. The scientist then generalizes from these observations in
order to formulate a hypothesis which he then tests and
confirms.

140

Popper challenged this picture of the scientific method on
two counts, denying that science proceeds by induction and

141 First,
denying that scientific proof consists of verification.
inductive reasoning itself poses a logical problem which has
dogged science from its beginning. Hume stated the "problem
of induction" in these terms:
-

[T]here is nothing in any object, considered in itself, which
138. See infra text accompanying notes 153-64.
139. K. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS:

KNOWLEDGE 33 (1962).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 36.

THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC
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can afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion beyond it;...

even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of object, we have no reason to draw any inference
concerning any object beyond those of which we have had
experience.

1 42

In logical terms, it is possible to negate a universal statement
by a singular statement; this is the modus tollens of formal
143
logic.

For example, "A black swan exists" negates the uni-

versal statement: "All swans are white." However, it is not
possible to turn this argument around and infer the universal
from the singular statement. Saying "A white swan exists" in
no way implies "All swans are white." Logically, this remains
the case no matter how many white swans one observes; it is
always possible that the next swan to come down the stream
will be black. Yet, despite this logical problem, the form of
any inductive inference is from singular to universal.
Popper's solution to the problem of induction grew out of
his thinking on the other defect he perceived in the usual
account of the scientific method. Successful tests conducted by
the scientist, it was supposed, verify his theory. However, verification by testing is nothing more than an inductive inference, never completely valid in strict logical terms.
Furthermore, Popper noted that verification by experience is
overinclusive. Virtually any statement about the world is supportable by reference to some event consistent with it. This is
as true of astrology as of physics.'4
142. D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 139 (Selby-Bigge & Nidditch eds.
1978). Hume made the psychological argument that the repetition of singular
instances inevitably leads us to infer a pattern which, generalized, is the universal. Id.
at 86-94. He acknowledged, however, that what human beings do is distinct from what
is logically justified. Id. at 88.
143. I. COPI, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 251-52 (5th ed. 1978).
144. With regard to the reigning psychological theories of his native Vienna,
Popper noted that neither Freud nor Adler would have any difficulty accounting for
the behavior of a man who would drown a child or one who would save it.
According to Freud the first man suffered from repression (say, of some
component of his Oedipus complex), while the second man had achieved
sublimation. According to Adler the first man suffered from feelings of
inferiority (producing perhaps the need to prove to himself that he dared to
commit some crime), and so did the second man (whose need was to prove to
himself that he dared to rescue the child). I could not think of any human
behaviour which could not be interpreted in terms of either theory. It was
precisely this fact-that they always fitted, that they were always confirmedwhich in the eyes of their admirers constituted the strongest argument in
favour of these theories. It began to dawn on me that this apparent strength
was in fact their weakness ....

96

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vqol. 13:65

Popper's key insight was to notice that scientific experiments are persuasive, not when they verify hypotheses, but
when there is a substantial risk that they will have the opposite effect: falsification. 145 For example, Einstein theorized
that light was subject to gravitation, which implied, among
other things, that the sun would affect the light of stars, making them shift position in the sky. Sir Arthur Eddington
designed an experiment, carried out in 1919, which compared
the position of stars as they normally appeared with their position during an eclipse taking place in their immediate vicinity.
The results confirmed Einstein's hypothesis; the stars appeared
46
to move away from the sun.'

Now the impressive thing about this case is the risk involved
in a prediction of this kind. If observation shows that the
predicted effect is definitely absent, the theory is simply
refuted. The theory is incompatible with certain possible
results of observation-in fact with results which everybody
before Einstein would have expected. This is quite different
from the situation I have previously described, when it
turned out that the theories in question were compatible
with the most divergent human behaviour, so that it was
practically impossible to describe any human behaviour that
47
might not be claimed to be a verification of these theories.L
What this showed, concluded Popper, was that "the criterionof
of a theory is its falsifiability,or refutabilthe scientific status
148
ity, or testability.'

This definition of true science differs from the picture of
the scientific method sketched above, in which scientific theories are verified by experimentation.
In other words: I shall not require of a scientific system that
it shall be capable of being singled out, once and for all, in a
positive sense; but I shall require that its logical form shall
be such that it can be singled out, by means of empirical
tests, in a negative sense: it might be possiblefor an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience.
K. POPPER, supra note 139, at 35. The weakness, of course, was that, in their ease of

verification, the theories were indistinguishable from any psuedo-science or religion.
But see A. Grunbaum, Is FreudianPsycho-Analytic Theory Pseudo-Scientific by Karl
Popper's Criterion of Demarcation?,16 AM. PHIL.

145. K. POPPER, supra note 139 at 36-37.
146. Id. at 35-36.
147. Id. at 36.
148. Id. at 37.

Q.

131 (1979).
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According to my proposal, what characterizes the empirical
method is its manner of exposing to falsification, in every
conceivable way, the system to be tested. Its aim is not to
save the lives of untenable systems but, on the contrary, to
select the one which is by comparison the fittest, by exposing
them all to the fiercest struggle for survival. 4 9
Exchanging falsification for verification solves the problem
of induction, at least so far as science is concerned. If a scientific theory is accepted as true because it has survived all
attempts at falsification, rather than because repeated experiments verify it, the logical defect of induction-the invalidity
of inferring a universal from a particular--ceases to be an
issue. Instead of induction, science relies solely on the impeccably logical modus tollens, the negation of a universal by a

particular. 15 0
Naturally, Popper's reconfiguration of the scientific
method has profound implications for the status of scientific
proof. The problem of induction was the hard core of the contradiction inherent in the logical positivists' claim that infer151
ences from observation could yield immutable truth.
Popper's solution was to surrender the claim to immutability
and to rest satisfied with the limited, tentative conclusions to
be drawn from experience.
The empirical basis of objective science has thus nothing
'absolute' about it. Science does not rest upon rock-bottom.
The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a
swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are
driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to
any natural or 'given' base; and when we cease our attempts
to drive our piles into a deeper layer, it is not because we
have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that they are firm enough to carry the structure, at
1 52
least for the time being.

149. K. POPPER, LOGIC, supra note 14, at 40-41.
150. Id. at 41.
151. Id. at 36.
152. Id. at 111. Another metaphor used by Popper is helpful in distinguishing his
approach from instrumentalism or what is usually called relativism:
I see our scientific theories as human inventions--nets designed by us to catch
the world. To be sure, these differ from the inventions of the poets, and even
from the inventions of the technicians. Theories are not only instruments.
What we aim at is truth: we test our theories in the hope of eliminating those
which are not true. In this way we may succeed in improving our theories-

98
C.

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 13:65

Verification, Falsificationand the Debate in Louisiana

The issues that troubled Popper were prominent in the
debate over the Creationism Act in the Louisiana legislature.
The debate over the Act was, however, Popper's worst
nightmare come true. By stressing science's supposed reliance
on induction and verification, the creationists fully exploited
the weakness inherent in that version of the scientific method:
in ease of verification, pseudo-science and religion are indistinguishable from science.
Scientists and philosophers of science have coped with the
problem of induction in a number of ways, but none has yet
concocted the strange mix of relativism and positivism put forward by the defenders of the Act in Louisiana. Science, the
creationists argued, verifies immutable facts. However, evolution (and, inexplicably, evolution alone) suffers from the problem of induction; it falls short of producing immutable truth.
Since creation science verifies facts, it is at least as "scientific"
as evolution, if not more so. It therefore ought to be taught in
15 3

Louisiana schools.

even as instruments: in making nets which are better and better adapted to
catch our fish, the real world. Yet they will never be perfect instruments for
this purpose. They are rational nets of our own making, and should not be
mistaken for a complete representation of the real world in all its aspects; not
even if they are highly successful; not even if they appear to yield excellent
approximations of reality.
K. POPPER, THE OPEN UNIVERSE: AN ARGUMENT FOR INDETERMINISM 42-43 (1982).
Contrast the theories of Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend and Richard Rorty. T.
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970); P. FEYERABEND,
AGAINST METHOD (1975); R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979).

Where Popper sees theories as more or less imperfect approximations of the world,
Kuhn, Feyerabend and Rorty reject the notion of approximating the world altogether.
See, A. O'HEAR, supra note 14, at 111-23; Popper, Normal Science and Its Dangers, in
CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 51 (I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave eds. 1970)

(Popper on Kuhn).
153. A variation of this argument appears in a number of the articles arguing that
strict construction of the establishment clause "establishes" a "religion of secular
humanism." Rather than contending that creationism verifies facts and is therefore
scientific, the argument is that evolution is incapable of being verified "scientifically"
and is therefore a religion.
The relevant factor in the conflict of beliefs in origin is that neither theory of
origin, creationism or evolutionism, is capable of scientific proof.... Both
theories of origins suffer from the inability scientifically to prove their
hypotheses, and both require an element of "faith." Therefore, the
evolutionary theory, an undergirding tenet of Secular Humanism, is religious
because of its dependents [sic] on "belief."
Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 3, at 53-54. Another example:
Despite intense argument to the contrary, evolution is inherently based on
speculative supposition and therefore constitutes a religious belief. Though it
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For example, Tom Ward, one of the Act's supporters,
argued that:
If you go beyond observations and if you go beyond experimentations, then you are beyond the realm of science. Scientific knowledge can only go so far as the things you can
observe and things you can experiment with. This is why it
is difficult for me to teach the theory of evolution because
origins such as the origin of man, the origin of matter, the
origin of energy, the origin of the earth, the origin of the
universe, any origin is beyond the realm of science.'
This argument refers to the problem of induction, but, far
from resolving it, merely exploits it in a manner typical of the
creationists' arguments before the legislature. The argument
rests on contradictory insistences that the theory of natural
selection is not logically impeccable and that science at large
somehow is.
Senator Keith, the main sponsor of the Act, argued along
lines similar to Ward's. He insisted on evolution's inability to
deduce its universal rule from singular instances-a "defect"
which evolution shares with all natural sciences, and which is
claims to be a science, it cannot be verified on the basis of the scientific
method. Since there is presently no way to 'test' the validity of the theory,
believing the theory to be true thus requires elements of faith.
Comment, supra note 3, at 352.
Another variation is the claim that science in general is fundamentally indistinguishable from religion:
Secular ideas, it is contended, are premised on objective, verifiable, demonstrable data, while theistic notions are based on no data-at all; or at best, that
that is subjective, mystical, and nondemonstrable. Those who make this argument fail to see that mysticism, subjectivism, and faith undergird even the
most objective of our knowledge and data, as well as our information-gathering methods. In the first place, all data must be interpreted: the bones, the
numbers, the photos, the reading taken on delicate scientific equipment-all
of the quantifiable and verifiable pieces take on meaning only when they are
arranged within the meaning-giving framework of some hypothesis. Hypothesizing is, itself, a subjective, even mystical process. Theories do not provide
verification; they are that which must be verified. And they can be verified
only in terms of techniques which themselves are predicated on even more
fundamental hypotheses and theories.
Toscano, supra note 3, at 201-202.
From this putative philosophical equivalence, the apologists of religion infer an
equivalence under the Constitution. Toscano, for example, concludes that religion
ought to be taught in public schools as a matter of "fairness" and "balance." Id. at 20309.
However, not only are religion and science philosophically distinct, as explained
above, the distinction is determinative of their treatment under the Constitution. See
infra text accompanying notes 232-39 & notes 311-14.
154. 1 Joint Appendix E85.
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no defect at all-and from that concluded that the scientific
status of the theory of natural selection was somehow suspect.
It has been repeatedly said during this meeting that I
noticed some said that evolution could be absolutely proven.
There were other speakers which said it could not be
proven. I think that this notes a serious disagreement over
1 55
the subject of evolution even in the scientific community.
While the creationists hammered away at the problem of
induction as it arises in evolution, they simultaneously held to
an assumption that scientific proof is absolute. The creationists
insisted repeatedly that evolution is not "proven fact." Representative Jenkins, a supporter of the Act, asked one witness, a
science teacher:
What I'm trying to find out is this: Number one, what is this
theory of evolution that's so scientific that it's the only thing
that should be taught in the schools on this subject? What is
it? Is it a theory, or is it proven fact, and does the theory
conform with reality in the most basic fundamental sense of
do we know whether it's possible that life can be created
from non-living material?' 56
From the fact that evolution could not meet their demand
for immutable truth, the creationists inferred a radical relativism. Nick Kalivoda, a witness in support of the Act, testified:
My experience in trying to teach the theory of evolution is
that it is a series of postulates that must be accepted on blind
faith. You cannot observe them and you cannot experiment
with them, therefore, they are beyond the realm of scientific
157
fact. This is a description of a myth, not a theory.
Another witness in favor of the Act, Byron Young, summed up
this line of the creationists' argument by testifying: "Since
neither of these theories have been proven absolutely, their

acceptance is strictly a personal choice.'

58

From this radical relativism, the creationists derived a
license for the teaching of their beliefs under the flag of "academic freedom." Dr. Boudreaux argued:
In fact, what the bill is actually supporting in my opinion is
academic freedom. Freedom to teach science objectively in
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at E273.
2 Joint Appendix E543-44, Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
1 Joint Appendix E92-93.
Id. at E23.
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the way that it should be taught and not biasedly. The problem is that evolution is [a] highly biased aspect of supposedly
supported scientific evidence. We're saying that creation science which teaches objectively as science the way it really is
and whether you were to believe that it's evolutionary or
creation, you're not going to prove either one with science.
That is going to be an element of faith.' 5 9
The creationists' embrace of these contradictory assumptions-that the theory of natural selection suffers from the
problem of induction while science at large produces immutable truth-was probably an unconscious error. With consistent
inconsistency, the creationists sought the title of science precisely for science's reputed capacity to provide absolute proof
of the truth of its assertions. In the hearings, Senator Keith
argued: "My intent is that we have the truth. I believe that
you want that as well and I believe that is your responsibility
to try and determine what is the truth and go from there."' 10
Professor Boudreaux testified:
The point is how can we teach in the school system a one
sided argument that is not even the truth. I can only say
that we are guilty of a lot of brainwashing. I have been
guilty of it and now I know that it is different and I know
quite clearly that we must put science in its objective (sic).
We must. We have a duty to educate at all levels from
gradeschool on through the college level what is the truth
161

And yet, the legislators knew or should have known that
scientific understanding is tentative and provisional. Witness
Paul Beizenherz explained that the hallmark of a genuinely
scientific explanation is its being open to falsification and revision, and that creationism, as presented by its supporters, did
not meet this description.
One of the main characteristics of the scientific theory is
that it can never be proven absolutely but it can be falsified.
... A set of ideas that cannot be falsified is not science....
Mr. Keith said that we would present a body of scientific evidence in support of creation theory. Dr. Boudreaux and
others did not, nor did they in the Senate hearings, present
such a body of scientific evidence.... One does not become a
159. Id. at E429.
160. Id. at E41.

161. Id. at E60-61.
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scientist by the simple act of trying to falsify another scientific system. One has to present an alternative system that
too must be falsifiable in principle. That I would submit they
62
have not done.'
Another witness explained the difference between science and
religion in Popperian terms:
I think everyone knows that the scientist gets data and then
says from these "I conclude. I may be wrong; I may change
tomorrow, but I conclude, and this is my present concept of
the matter." The religious man says I have listened to the
still small voice that is spoken within me. I think it's the
voice of God, and I have faith that what I believe that I cannot prove is true because that still small voice within me
tells me it's true, and that's the difference. Therefore, the
scientist says, "I conclude." The religious man says, "I
63
believe."'
The Act's supporters, however, could not or would not recognize the difference between the tentative, provisional truths
of science and the absolute truths asserted by religion. In
questioning a science teacher testifying against the Act, Representative Jenkins, a supporter of the Act, asked:
I am a little bit confused about some of the things you've
said. For example, you said that science does not and will not
ever concern itself with God or the concept of God. I don't
really understand that. If there is a God, and he exists, that
will be a fact, will it not, a scientific fact? If he does not,
that would seem to be a scientific fact as well. That would
seem to me, would it not to you [to be] of some interest to
scientists. 164
The reason science does not concern itself with the existence
of God is that any scientific account of His existence would be
tentative and provisional-and wholly unacceptable to the
162. 2 Joint Appendix E570-72.

163. Id. at E609 (Kent).
164. Id. at E561-62.
Representative Jenkins made his point more directly in another exchange:
I want to ask you a question, please sir. I don't truly understand the
distinction you draw between science and religion. It seems to me that a
statement is either true or false. It's a fact or it's falsehood, or, in some cases
it might be partially true or partially false. I don't understand how you draw
this distinction between-you label certain things science, other things
religion. If we're talking about one, we shouldn't concern ourselves with the
other.
Id. at E608.
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faithful on that ground. If there is a God and He exists, in
Representative Jenkins' terms, that is not something that
could be disproven. To claim that God's existence could be
established as a scientific fact is to assume that science can
establish truth beyond disproof. And that is surely to misapprehend science.
It is tempting at this point to revert to the notion of a
sham; to say that creationism is sham science and to conclude
with Justice Brennan that the Act was therefore motivated by
a sham secular purpose. This is especially tempting given that
the Louisiana legislature did hear clarifying testimony on the
scientific method. As we have seen however, sham analysis, a
descendant of Everson's "incidental benefits" theory, is insupportable on its own terms. It focuses exclusively on legislative
intent, without examining what effects on religion render the
legislation invalid or why. Asserting that Louisiana had sanctioned sham science says nothing about why that is impermissible under the clause.
The proper way to analyze the Act under the establishment clause is to stress not just that creationism is not true science, but that it is not falsifiable in principle. What renders
the Act unconstitutional is its operating to inculcate immutable
truth. This approach would relieve us not only of sham analysis based on Everson, but also of any need under Zorach to rely
on the Act's very remote tendency to establish a state church.
The Act was no more likely than the tax breaks in Mueller to
lead to a state church. It was, however, very likely to succeed
in advancing belief not falsifiable in principle.
In other words, Aguillard is best analyzed by use of the
definition of invalidating effects suggested by Epperson: Legislation or executive action is invalid under the establishment
clause when it has the effect of advancing dogma. The last
term can now be replaced with a more precise term, rendering
a definition of invalidating effects which I will call the "test of
falsifiability": Legislation or executive action is invalid under
the establishment clause when it has the effect of advancing
belief not falsiftable in principle.
The question remains, of course, why such an effect is
unconstitutional.
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THE DEONTOLOGICAL CONSTITUTION AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

My argument for the test of falsifiability is, from one
angle, an excursion into the obvious. It rests on the notion
that the establishment clause protects freedom of conscience. 165 It should be clear from my diagnosis of Lemon,
however, why that idea needs explication. Freedom of conscience has played a negligible role in establishment clause
doctrine. The hollow roots of Lemon in Everson and Zorach
suggest that a close examination of the roots of the test of falsifiability may be the best way of making a case for it. If the
test can be founded in the structure of the Constitution itself
and in deeply held values like freedom of conscience, the contrast with Everson and Zorach is itself an argument for replacing Lemon with the definition of invalidating effects proposed
here.
A necessary first step in that argument is to state a theory
of the Constitution itself; one that gives freedom of conscience
a central role. A brief sketch would do, but the underlying
theory outlined here will be somewhat more elaborate for two
reasons. First, a central premise of accommodationist accounts
of the establishment clause is that, in unvarnished terms, the
Constitution organizes a Christian nation. The account of the
Constitution that follows is designed to rebut that notion
implicitly, to deny that the Constitution supposes or supports
religious principles of any kind. Second, in arguing for the test
of falsifiability, I want to stress that it does not embody an
ideal of neutrality between religion and non-religion. On the
contrary, the Constitution positively favors the secular, within
the limits imposed by the free exercise clause, for positive
moral reasons. In order to make that argument, it is necessary
to dissociate the conception of the Constitution I rely on here
from one which is an easy target for critics of liberalism: the
purportedly value-neutral procedural Constitution.
A.

The ProceduralConstitution

The test of falsifiability is premised on the idea that the
165. Professor David A. J. Richards gives an exhaustive account of the historical
connection between conscience and the establishment clause in D. RICHARDS,
TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986); see also Richards, Religion, Public
Morality and ConstitutionalLaw in NOMOS XXX: RELIGION, MORALITY AND THE LAW
152 (Pennock & Chapman eds. 1988).
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Constitution embodies a deontological theory of justice.'
The
deontological Constitution is familiar to most readers, though
the term may not be. John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust
relies on such a conception of the Constitution, without, however, providing an adequate defense of the idea.16 7 One way to
present the notion of the deontological Constitution, therefore,
is to give Ely's barebones version of it and then to elaborate
that version. 68
The argument of Democracy and Distrust is that the
Supreme Court's striking down legislation passed by the
elected branches is justifiable to the extent the Court is
engaged in policing the process of representation. 1 69 The
Court's function is that of the referee: not to ensure a particular outcome of the political process, but simply to ensure that
the process works fairly. 7 ° The Court's role is to enhance the
representative and consensual nature of American government-and hence its legitimacy-by clearing the channels of
71
political activity.'

Naturally, this supposes a particular understanding of the
Constitution. The most telling negative formulation of Ely's
thesis is this: The Court's function is not to enforce fundamental values embodied in the Constitution because the Constitu166. See infra text accompanying notes 190-231. The term deontological means,
generally, having to do with ethics or duty. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY
378
(2d college ed. 1976). As explained more fully below, it has come to refer to any social
theory which operates independently of a theory of the good; that is, without reference
to supposed proper ends or purposes of human life. See injfra text accompanying notes
181-85.
Deontological liberalism has been subjected to powerful scrutiny in the last decade
or so. See A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981); M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND
THE
LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975).
Michael
Sandel frames his critique of deontological liberalism as an examination of
John
Rawls's A Theory of Justice. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
Sandel attacks
Rawls's conception of the person, the same notion of autonomous or free and
equal
persons I rely on here. See inkfra text accompanying notes 219-39. Consequently,
a
brief account of the Rawls/Sandel dispute is necessary. Notes 224, 225, 229, 230 and
231
infra form a more or less continuous essay serving that purpose.
167. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
168. The connection between Ely and deontological liberalism has been noted in
Regan, Community and Justice in Constitutional Theory, 1985 WiS. L. REV.
1073.
Regan notes the connection between Ely and John Rawls so that he may extrapolate
a
critique of Ely based on Michael Sandel's critique of Rawls. See supra note 166. Given
that Sandel misreads Rawls, it is not surprising that Regan misconstrues
the
connection between Rawls and Ely. See infra text accompanying notes 201-216.
169. J. ELY, supra note 167, at 73-104.
170. Id. at 103.
171. Id. at 105-34.
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172
tion is not primarily a repository of fundamental values.
The Constitution is, rather, a set of specifications for the conduct of government; it is a procedural superstructure designed
to accomplish the necessary business of society. 1 73 Judicial
intervention is appropriate only when the process is malfunctioning.17 4 Moreover, the Constitution can be said to be malfunctioning only "when the process is undeserving of trust."

Our government cannot fairly be said to be "malfunctioning"
simply because it sometimes generates outcomes with which
we disagree, however strongly (and claims that it is reaching
results with which "the people" really disagree-or would
"if they understood"-are likely to be little more than selfdeluding projections). 7 5
Ely's picture of the Constitution as a procedural superstructure is but one argument in defense of his theory of judicial review. 76 It 77has proven to be a contentious and vulnerable
1
point, however.
the Constitution is,
Ely's argument is descriptive:
78
that make substanThe
parts
unarguably, mostly procedure.1
tive choices or enshrine fundamental values are, in compari-

son, few and far between. 179 The simple response to Ely's

172. Id. at 43-72 & 92.
173. I set aside the question, what is the necessary business of society? Classical
Liberalism is associated with the minimal, "night-watchman" state and the protection
of private property. For a more sophisticated account of a liberal program, see R.
DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 181-204 (1985).
174. J. ELY, supra note 167, at 101-04.
175. Id. at 103.
176. Id. at 87-88.
177. See Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect: The Substantive
Content of Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1983) [hereinafter Baker,
Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed
Outcome Equality]; Baker,
Interpretationsof Equal Protection, 58 TEx. L. REV. 1029 (1980) [hereinafter Baker,
Neutrality]; Grano, Ely's Theory of Judicial Review: Preserving the Significance of
the PoliticalProcess, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 167 (1981); Karst, Foreward-Equal Citizenship
Under the Fourteenth Amendment 91 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1977); Perry, Interpretivism,
Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection,42 OHIO ST. L.J. 261 (1981); Tribe, The
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063
(1980); Tushnet, Darkness at the Edge of Town: The Contributionsof John Hart Ely to
ConstitutionalTheory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980).
178. J. ELY, supra note 167, at 90.
179. Id. at 92. Ely argues that two notable attempts to enshrine substantive values
Id. at 99-100. Of the clearly
have suffered an ill fate: slavery and prohibition.
substantive guarantees, many are open to alternative readings and can be seen to
address the structure of the political system. For example, the fourth amendment
surely protects privacy, but it also serves political equality.
That rationale [privacy] intertwines with another ... namely a fear of official
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argument is that his description of the Constitution is distorted
and idiosyncratic. While the Constitution's text may be mostly
procedural, many would argue that those portions which
uphold substantive values are its most important provisions.18 0
One particular sentence is striking in this regard. Of the substantive provisions he cannot reinterpret, Ely writes: "But
they're an odd assortment, the understandable products of particular historical circumstances- guns, religion, contract, and
so on-and in any event are few and far between."''
Only in
the pre-Reagan era could anyone dismiss the values of "guns,
religion, contract and so on" as an "odd assortment."
Whatever its wisdom, the conservative movement of the 1980's
was extraordinarily successful and was predicated on precisely
discretion. In deciding whose lives to disrupt in the ways the amendment
indicates-that is, whom to search or arrest or whose goods to seize-law
enforcement officials will necessarily have a good deal of low visibility
discretion. In addition they are likely in such situations to be sensitive to
social station and other factors that should not bear on the decision. The
amendment thus requires not simply a certain quantum of probability but also
when possible, via the warrant requirement, the judgment of a "neutral and
detached magistrate." From this perspective, which obviously is only one of
several, the fourth amendment can be seen as another harbinger of the equal
protection clause, concerned with avoiding indefensible inequalities in
treatment.
Id. at 96-97.
180. In the fifth amendment, for example, due process prior to takings is
prescribed, not as part of the political process, but as a means to keep private property
in private hands; to preserve the institution of private property. Tribe, supra note 177,
at 1065-67 & n.12; Regan, supra note 168, at 1110. Regarding the first amendment, Ely
himself concedes that the best explanation for the Free Exercise Clause is that: "[Flor
the framers religion was an important substantive value they wanted to put
significantly beyond the reach of at least the federal legislature." J. ELY, supra note
167, at 94.
Similarly, he argues that the prohibition on self-incrimination preserves the
reliability of criminal prosecutions, but concedes that it is also based on the notion that
"there is simply something immoral... about the state's asking somebody whether he
committed a crime and expecting him to answer." Id. Several commentators have
pointed out that the same logic applies to the sixth amendment's guarantee of counsel.
Regan, supra note 168, at 1111 (citing Grano, supra note 177, at 176).
Ely argues that the eighth amendment outlaws cruel and unusual punishment in
open-ended terms because, broadly speaking, it addresses unequal treatment. J. ELY,
supra note 167, at 97. But this explanation is far less compelling than the simple
notion that it was written so as to bar whatever forms of torture the future may
devise. Regan, supra note 168, at 1111. Finally, there is no way around the fact that
the Constitution is just as concerned with the substance of slavery in abolishing it as in
guaranteeing it. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 & amend. XIII.
Interestingly, Ely concedes the establishment clause to the opposition, declining to
make the argument that I propose here: that the clause is best understood as serving
the Constitution's deontological premises.
181. J. ELY, supra note 167, at 101 (footnotes omitted).

108

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 13:65

those values.18 2

A second, stronger objection to the procedural Constitution is that it seems to aspire to a neutrality as between citizens that just cannot be achieved:
The process theme's claim of value neutrality might imply
either that the choice of process has no value implications or
that the proper process does not itself favor some values
over others. But the theorist obviously cannot assert that
the process is or should be value neutral in the sense of having no value implications. Such a claim would be absurd.
Processes obviously make a difference: clearly there are
value differences between democratic and authoritarian
regimes, and different processes clearly result in the selection of different ends. Moreover, if the process has no value
implications, it seems odd that the neutrality theorist is so
concerned with it.'

In the context of the establishment clause, the objection would
be that a Constitution which does not ensure virtuous, moral
or Godly outcomes on some level is not neutral as to those values. Given that virtue, morality and Godliness need and
deserve support, the procedural Constitution's non-support
amounts to animosity, not neutrality.'s4
Despite these objections, however, Ely's basic point seems
valid. "The American Constitution has thus by and large
remained a constitution, properly so called, concerned with
constitutive questions. What has distinguished it, and indeed
the United States itself, has been a process of government, not
a governing ideology. '"185 As David Lyons has pointed out, it is
the terminology of substance and procedure that leaves Ely
vulnerable. 86 Certainly the Constitution preserves substantive
values: liberty, equality, privacy. To the extent it preserves
those values, it is not neutral. What Ely means to say, according to Lyons, is that the Constitution does not mandate partic182. See GOTTFRIED & FLEMING, THE CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT (1988). But see
infra note 199.
183. Baker, Neutrality, supra note 177, at 1040. Baker's full critique, it should be
noted, is considerably more complex. See id. at 1042.
184. See J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAWS AND NATURAL RIGHTS 221-23 (1980); Finnis,
Legal Enforcement of "Duties to Oneself": Kant v. Neo-Kantians, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
433, 437, 452-56 (1988).
185. J. ELY, supra note 167, at 101.
186. Lyons, Substance, Process and Outcome in
CORNELL L. REV. 745, 752 (1987).

Constitutional Theory, 72
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ular outcomes- 8 7
This clarification is helpful, but it leaves several questions

unanswered. Lyons notes first of all that, even if the description as refined is more precise, it may or may not be more
accurate. The underlying question of what sort of political
community the Constitution organizes remains unanswered.18 8
In addition, it seems there is a simple explanation for the Constitution's not specifying outcomes. Detailed policy choices just
cannot be made at a government's birth. There is a practical,
functional distinction between a Constitution and legislation.
To say the Constitution does not specify outcomes is to say
very little.
However, Lyons's substituting "outcomes" for "substance"
is a good beginning in recasting Ely's procedural Constitution
into something more defensible and more servicable for my
purposes here. Ely himself suggests a fruitful approach:
Don't get me wrong: our Constitution has always been substantially concerned with preserving liberty.... The question that is relevant to our inquiry is how that concern has
been pursued. The principal answers to that, we have seen,
are by a quite extensive set of procedural protections, and by
a still more elaborate scheme designed to ensure that in the
making of substantive choices the decision process will be
open to all on something approaching an equal basis, with
the decision-makers held to a duty to take into account the
interests of all those their decisions affect.18 9
The key to redeeming the procedural Constitution is to draw
this out, to clarify the connection between the features of the
Constitution Ely emphasizes and the ideal of liberty. His
descriptive argument alone is unpersuasive. Ely demonstrates
that the Constitution is amenable to his reading, but not that
that reading is definitive. Furthermore, given that the procedural Constitution cannot pretend to neutrality, how can it justify the preferences it does show? The issue is, does the
interpretation of the Constitution as procedural superstructure
describe a Constitution we are willing to accept as just? To
answer that question, we need to see the Constitution's not dictating particular policy outcomes as part of a broader political
philosophy.
187. Id..
188. Id. at 753.
189. J. ELY, supra note 167, at 100.
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The Constitution and Deontological Justice

As a first step, consider a basic distinction between the
notions of "the good" and "the right."1 " The good has to do
with the proper ends, or supposed proper ends, of life. It is
what properly constituted reason will choose, simply because
to do so is proper according to an overarching conception of
human purpose. The right, in contrast, describes relations
between persons along the way, so to speak, without reference
to their chosen ends or the propriety of those ends. A social
theory addressing the question of the right is likely to stress
notions of fairness, equality and liberty; a theory turning on a
conception of the good will rely more on notions of virtue, duty
and propriety.
Two meanings of the term justice can be distinguished,
which differ in whether the good is given priority over the
right or vice versa. Justice conceived with reference to the
good describes treatment appropriate to the particular ends of
human existence which one's theory of the good posits. For
example:
Governance, for Aquinas, was not the strictly remedial or
punitive reality it was for Augustine; governance could be an
expression of that human nature which has God for its origin.... [H]is conviction that human reason can know with

conviction the natural law that orders us (even after Adam)
toward our proper end of communion with God, allowed
Aquinas to develop a theory of social and political life
focused on human possibility rather than depravity; on
human creativity as an expression of our God-given natural
gifts, rather than on obedience to a 9social order whose primary function is to keep evil at bay.' '
190. See J. RAWLS, supra note 166, at 30-32; M. SANDEL,supra note 166, at 2-7.
191. G. WEIGEL, TRANQUILLITAS ORDINIS: THE PRESENT FAILURE AND FUTURE
PROMISE OF AMERICAN CATHOLIC THOUGHT ON WAR AND PEACE 34 (1987). Another
example is the Pope's apostolic letter "On the Dignity of Women" issued September
30, 1988.
The moral and spiritual strength of a woman is joined to her awareness that
God entrusts the human being to her in a special way. Of course, God
entrusts every human being to each and every other human being. But this
entrusting concerns women in a special way-precisely by reason of their
femininity--and this in a particular way determines their vocation.
N.Y. Times (National Edition), Oct. 1, 1988, at 6, col. 6.
This is not to suggest that Christianity alone conceives justice as an expression of
the good. Utilitarianism too is based on advancing a conception of the good. J. RAWIS,
supra note 166, at 23-27.
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A theory such as this, which gives priority to the good over the
right, is a teleological theory of justice.
Justice conceived with reference to the right, on the other
hand, begins with two premises: 1) that individual persons
properly choose their own ends; and, 2) that in fact individuals
choose a variety of conflicting ends.'9 2 This presents a
dilemma: how to ensure social order without infringing on the
individual's free choice of ends. The simple solution of justice
conceived with reference to the good-attributing a single
overriding end to all- is foreclosed. "As regards happiness,
men do have different thoughts about it and each places it
where he wants, and hence their wills cannot be brought under
any common principle, nor, consequently, under any external

law compatible with the freedom of everyone.' ' 1 93

The best known solution to this problem-how to formulate just laws, or a system to produce just laws, without reference to a single conception of the good-is that of John Rawls,
set out in his A Theory of Justice. Of the priority of the right
in his own theory, Rawls writes:
The principles of right, and so of justice, put limits on which
satisfactions have value; they impose restrictions on what
are reasonable conceptions of one's good. In drawing up
plans and in deciding on aspirations men are to take these
constraints into account. Hence in justice as fairness one

does not take men's propensities and inclinations as given,
whatever they are, and then seek the best way to fulfill
them. Rather, their desires and aspirations are restricted
from the outset by the principles of justice which specify the
boundaries that men's systems of ends must respect. We can
express this by saying that in justice as fairness the concept
of right is prior to that of the good.' 94

A theory of justice which, like Rawls's, places the right over
the good is known as a deontological theory of justice.
The procedural Constitution described by Ely can be

strengthened immeasurably by grounding it explicitly in a
deontological theory of justice.'9 5 Ely's denial that the Constitution is designed to produce specified outcomes is at bottom a
192. See Rawls, supra note 6, at 229-30.
193. Kant, On the Proverb: That May be True in Theory, But Is of No Practical
Use, in PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYs 72 (T. Humphrey ed. 1983).

194. J. RAWLS, supra note 166, at 31. See also Rawls, The Priority of Right and
Ideas of the Good, 17 PHIL. AND PUB. AFF. 251 (1988).
195. Ely implicitly acknowledges this in discussing the ideal of equality and the
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denial that the Constitution was formulated, or ought to be

interpreted, with reference to the good. The Constitution does
not posit and enforce a particular vision of the good and proper
ends of human life. Instead, the Constitution assumes the pri-

ority of the right over the good and posits a solution to the
problem that ordering poses: assuming that people do properly
choose their own ends and that in their pursuit of inconsistent
ends they are likely to come into conflict, how should
we
96
define the proper sphere and conduct of government?1
Madison stated these premises in The Federalist.
As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at
liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As
long as the connection subsists between his reason and his
self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal
influence on each other; and the former will be objects to
which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the
faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate,
is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of
government. From the protection of different and unequal
faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different
degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from
the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the
respective proprietors ensues a division of the society into
different interests and parties.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature
of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different
degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances
of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points . . .
have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them
with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for
their common good.' 97
To say that the Constitution does not embody a particular
insupportable assumption of "pure" republican theory that "the people" are essentially
homogeneous. J. ELY, supra note 167, at 79-82.
196. The argument against strict construction of the establishment clause often
rests on an inability or refusal to recognize the distinction between deontological and
teleological conceptions of justice. In the midst of an otherwise informed discussion of
legal positivism, for example, one commentator writes: "The question needs to be
posed: to what end does the science of legal positivism aspire?" Comment, supra note

3, at 336.
197. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78-79 (J. Madison) (Rossiter ed. 1961).
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conception of the good, that it is not a teleological Constitution,
is weaker than the claim that the Constitution does not reflect
fundamental values and stronger than the claim that it does
not specify outcomes. The essential point is that the Constitution does not gather the lives of citizens in an overarching
vision of human destiny, or subsume their wills to an overriding vision of the good and proper life.' 98 While it protects substantive values, those protections do not add up to a
comprehensive vision of human purpose and the Constitution
does not authorize the deployment of coercive state power to
achieve one. While the Constitution does not specify outcomes,
it refrains from doing so for reasons beyond the impossibility
of making policy choices at the outset. The Constitution
assumes that people do properly choose their own ends, and
subjects government to the constraints this imposes.
The deontological Constitution is the same Constitution
Ely argues for: a procedural superstructure; a device for collecting legitimating consensus and effecting necessary compromise in the writing and execution of law. The difference
between Ely's procedural Constitution and the deontological
Constitution lies in the defense of it. The thesis of the deontological Constitution does not require us to minimize or explain
away those provisions of the Constitution which articulate fundamental values or substantive outcomes. The deontological
Constitution implies only that the substantive, fundamental
values which the Constitution does protect do not add up to a
comprehensive, internally consistent conception of the good
and proper life. The Constitution's protections for contract,
equality, guns and privacy do not direct the lives of the citizens
living under it to the fulfillment of an ultimate purpose. 99
C. A Teleological Critique and a Reply
For the moment, I will put off making the positive case for
the deontological Constitution in favor of combining it with a
complementary account of the establishment clause in Part
198. In Ely's phrase, the Constitution is not marked by a governing ideology. J.
ELY, supra note 167, at 100.
199. This is probably the true meaning of Ely's comment that the substantive
protections for guns, religion and contract are an "odd assortment." He means, not
that those values are trivial, but that they do not form a comprehensive, coherent
whole centered around a guiding philosophy of human purpose. If this is an accurate
reading, he is certainly correct.
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V.200 The argument is not textual, like Ely's, of course; nor is
it an historical argument.2 ° ' I will argue simply that the deontological Constitution is one we are willing to accept as just
and that the test of falsifiability is supported by the same theory of justice. Before turning back to the establishment clause,
however, I wish to emphasize the difference between Ely's procedural Constitution, the deontological Constitution and a teleological conception of the Constitution.
200. See infra text accompanying notes 219-31.
201. An historical argument would suffer from the weaknesses common to
arguments from Framers' intent. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 173, at 34-57; R.
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 359 (1986).
John P. Diggins suggests the historical argument in his account of the
Constitution's neglect of virtue as a political concept. See J. DIGGINS, THE LOST SOUL
OF AMERICAN POLITICS: VIRTUE, SELF-INTEREST AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM

48-99 (1984). Diggins' explanation of why the Constitution is "mostly procedure," J.
ELY, supra note 167, at 90, rather than a hortatory catalogue of good ends and the
qualities needed to attain them, demonstrates that the key framers of the Constitution
were operating on premises similar to deontological liberalism.
First, there was a recognition that the population's being heterogeneous precluded
their uniting to create a virtuous society on any model:
[T]he Federalist marks a significant departure from the Declaration, in which
Jefferson expressed his belief that America constituted "one people" acting
together, and from English tradition, in which Parliament was regarded as the
institution authorized to speak for the people as a whole. The framers
believed instead that authority, although derving [sic] from the people, could
not be expressed directly through them because the masses of citizens not
only were incapable of safeguarding their own liberties but were too divided
among themselves to bring forth the general good and to engage in the
necessary unity of action that could exercise sovereign authority in one body.
J. DIGGINS, supra at 56. The recognition of heterogeneity and the consequent preoccupation with the danger of "faction" transformed the operative conception of liberty:
The idea of liberty also undergoes something resembling a Humean transformation in the Federalist. Here liberty is not so much a natural endowment of
man but one of the rights that man possesses to the extent that society recognizes such rights; and the test of rights is whether or not they can be exercised, whether man has the means to give political effect to them. Rights, like
property, are an aspect of power, more a social possession than a natural condition, and it was thought that they could be safeguarded in the Constitution
not by appealing to "self-evident" truths but by dispersing and countervailing
power in order to control it.
Id. at 61-62. Given these premises, religion could not possibly play a significant role in
the organization of government:
The framers seemed to have been of two minds about religion. When it was
universal, noninstitutional, and uncoerced, religion could possibly constrain
action and inhibit desire; when it was particular, doctrinaire, and sectarian, it
did more to activate the passions, as a zealous man hungers after righteousness. More fearful of the latter tendency, the framers placed little hope in
religion as the bulwark of the Constitution.
Id. at 80.
Diggins, it should be noted, would not concur in the larger deontological argument
advanced in this article.
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One of my reasons for doing so is the fact that those who
argue that strict construction of the establishment clause illegitirnately "establishes" a "religion of secular humanism" rely
on the premise that the constitution embodies a teleological
theory of justice. For example:
The history of the religion clauses and their resulting relationship indicate the theistic concept of law and religion was
well entrenced [sic] in our constitutional heritage. Liberty,
for example, is understood in the first amendment as emanating from a higher law. As well, the over-all definition of
religion, as understood in the first century of American independence, adhered to traditional theistic concepts. James
Madison wrote that religion meant a duty which we owe to a
creator and the manner of discharging it.2 "2
While addressing the thesis that the Constitution rests on
Judeo-Christian premises might be the more direct approach,
my larger purposes are better served by rebutting the more
general proposition that the Constitution has teleological
premises of any kind.2 °3
My second reason for dwelling further on the nature of
202. Comment, supra note 3, at 340 (footnotes omitted). Another example:
Religion, as defined in Davis [v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890)], involves a belief
in a "Creator," which, the Court held, imposes certain obligations upon each
individual to obey the will of the "Creator," or Supreme Being. This
definition of religion mirrors that understood by James Madison, and those
within the historical milieu that drafted the first amendment, and is,
therefore, both historically and constitutionally accurate. Moreover, the
Court's definition corresponds with American religious heritage and was
applicable to a society overwhelmingly dominated by theistic Christianity.
This non-sectarian definition, applied to a Judeo-Christian society, is clearly
compatible with the first amendment religion clauses.
Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 3, at 8.
203. In addressing the nature of the Constitution, I leave aside a separate, closely
related argument made by the apologists of religion. Those who argue for
accommodation based on a teleological conception of the Constitution invariably point
to the Declaration of Independence as authority:
The traditional theistic concept of positive law as being based on a higher law
was well entrenched in American political and juridicial institutions during
the formative years of the Republic. A higher or objective natural law was the
cornerstone of the Declaration of Independence wherein is expressed the
theistic belief that "God endows man with certain inalienable rights."
Comment, supra note 3, at 338.
Biblical theism is clearly expressed in such founding documents as the Declaration of Independence, which presupposes that "God" endows men with "inalienable rights."
Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 3, at 25.
The relevance of the Declaration to the interpretation of the Constitution is never
spelled out, however. Even John P. Diggins, who makes a sophisticated argument that
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the deontological Constitution is to stress a premise of my
argument that I stated at the outset: in interpreting the establishment clause there is no refuge in the notion of neutrality.
To teach science in public schools rather than religion is to
favor the secular. I want to stress the distinction between the
procedural and deontological Constitution, in order to emphasize that the latter does not aspire to neutrality. The argument
in favor of the deontological Constitution, and in favor of the
test of falsifiability, is not that the Constitution so conceived is
neutral as between citizens' chosen ways of life: obviously it
disfavors a conception of the good life that entails governmental intervention and support in the service of religious ideals.
Instead of neutrality, the central ideal of the deontological
Constitution might be called indeterminancy. The Constitution has no object, no end in mind, so to speak, for the citizens
living under it. A constitution having such an object would
place citizens in the service of that idea and so infringe on individual autonomy. Indeterminacy in this sense is not the same
as neutrality because it disfavors those who would use government to achieve divine ends. More important, indeterminacy is
not morally neutral: the idea is that to use citizens as means to
a constitutionally prescribed end is immoral. Accordingly, the
deontological Constitution positively favors those means and
ends of government that do not posit an end for individual
lives lived under it. The larger argument of this article, taken
up in Part V, is that the secular--empirical, critical ways of
understanding the world, as exemplified in science-is indeterminate in this sense and thus congruent with constitutional
government in a way that religion is not.
Exchanging Ely's strong claim that the Constitution is procedural for the weaker claim that it is deontological shifts the
ground of the debate between Ely and his detractors. Where
Ely's opponents could rebut his claim that the Constitution is
procedural simply by pointing to substantive provisions protecting fundamental values, the deontological Constitution
the Declaration ought to form the basis of American political community, recognizes
that the Declaration and the Constitution rest on fundamentally different premises:
By 1788, the doctrine of rights had a new political status that no longer
required ontological foundations in the laws of nature and of God or classical
foundations in the ideas of Montesquieu and Machiavelli. To put it another
way, the Declaration of Independence had its justification in the principles
that could be derived from nature, classical politics in the ideas of virtue, and
the Constitution in the truths that reside in power.
J. DIGGINS, supra note 201, at 62 (1984).
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imposes a heavier burden on rebuttal. If the Constitution is
not deontological, but teleological-if it posits a coherent, comprehensive theory of the good and proper ends of life-the burden is on the proponents of that position to say what that
theory is and to defend it as a specifically constitutional value.
It is not enough to point to substantive provisions; it must be
possible to add them up.
This shift in the grounds of the debate is well illustrated
by the one article which has attacked the deontological basis of
Ely's theory." 4 A leading critique of deontological theories of
justice is that of Michael Sandel, stated in his Liberalism and
the Limits of Justice."5 Milton Regan has translated Sandel's
arguments into a constitutional theory which purports to show
that the inherent weaknesses of deontology infect Ely's work.
Regan, however, fails to grasp the nature of Ely's deontological
premises and, as a result, his attack fails.
Sandel's arguments are directed against John Rawls, the
leading expositor of the deontological theory of justice.20 6 Following Sandel's lead, Regan draws a parallel between Rawls
and Ely.
The Rawlsian constitution's concern with the justice of the
political process embodies the priority of the right over the
good. Its ideal is the perfect procedural justice of the original
position-an ideal that incorporates no substantive conception of the good. This concern for justice is indifferent to the
particular values chosen by the political process, as long as
that process is structured fairly....
While Rawls's deontology results in an emphasis on process, Ely's concern with process is based on deontological
premises. First, representation-reinforcing review embodies
the priority of the right over the good. Ely's principal concern is the fairness of the process for assessing competing
claims, not the substantive merit of the claims that prevail.
His political ideal is thus pure procedural justice, an arrange-

ment whereby outcomes are justified solely by the integrity
of the process that produces them.20 7

204. Regan, supra note 168.
205. M. SANDEL, supra note 166. See also A. MACINTYRE, supra note 166; R.
note 166.
206. Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 308,
311 (1985). ("[Sandel's theory relies on] an interpretation and criticism of Rawls's
UNGER, supra

theory, which he reasonably assumes to be the best theory liberalism has yet to
offer.").
207. Regan, supra note 168, at 1102-03.
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Based on his assumption that it is Ely's proceduralism that
defines his theory as deontological, Regan makes the argument
that the Constitution is not procedural, but substantive."'
From the fact that the Constitution protects substantive values, Regan leaps to the conclusion that the Court has "undeniably articulated a vision of substantive values."20 9 The Court
should continue to do so, Regan concludes, making constitutional adjudication an occasion to answer questions of human
purpose and communal identity, in short, to define a guiding
theory of the good.
The Supreme Court's articulations of the values animating
American society in various historical periods have in some
measure provided statements of national identity. Such
adjudication has generated a dialogue on what our nation
stands for; in Sandel's terms, it has forced us to ask not
merely "What shall we choose?" but "Who are we?"
Instances of this phenomenon abound. The history of
economic substantive due process doctrine, for instance,
reflects evolution in the importance society has assigned to
private property. More recent substantive due process decisions have confronted the question of the substantive importance of privacy . . .

The result has been a sustained,

explicitly moral dialogue on visions of the good that in part
constitute our national identity. For those engaged in the
dialogue, the vision of the good
we adopt implicates who we
210
are and what we stand for.
In progressing from the substantive provisions of the Constitution to the Court's defining the nation's "vision of the
good," Regan vaults an enormous gap in his theory. Perhaps
the Court could define a comprehensive vision of the good that
would constitute our national identity.2 1 1 What that hope overlooks, however, is that the Constitution itself does not contain
208. Id. at 1110-17.
209. Id. at 1113.
210. Id. at 1113-14.
211. More likely, it could not. The task Regan proposes for the Court is utopian,
to say the least.
These considerations suggest that substantive constitutional review provides
perhaps the best institutional opportunity for the discovery of those shared
meanings that enter into national, and thus individual, identity. Sandel notes
that such a process must be ongoing, and our self-definition open to revision,
if we are to achieve a stable identity amid the flux of experience. By
articulating to the nation the meaning of shared values at particular historical
moments, substantive constitutional review affirms the stability of those
values by suggesting their current application. Such an exercise provides

1989]

The Establishment Clause

such a vision. The mere fact that the Constitution contains
substantive protections for fundamental values does not mean
that those substantive provisions add up to a coherent conception of ultimate good or human destiny. Regan assumes that it
does, but the burden is on him to say what that conception is
and to defend it as a specifically constitutional value.
He makes no attempt to do so. The most notable feature
of Regan's communitarian constitutional theory is a studied
vagueness in the use of terms like "shared conceptions of the
good," 22 "the substantive values we share,"" 3 "shared meanings, ' ' 21 4 and "our shared identity.2 12
Those common meanings, values and shared conceptions of the good are never
specified, of course, because they do not exist. 21 6 At least, they
assurance that our shared identity has not dissolved despite the course of
history.
Id. at 1121. What this ignores entirely is the fragility of the Court as a political body.
Citizens go to court because of conflict, and no court-including and especially the
Supreme Court--can ever resolve that conflict in all its dimensions. Any serious theory of judicial review must account for the threat this poses to the Court's perceived
legitimacy.
Just as voters with different sets of grievances coalesce to defeat incumbents,
and congress asserts itself more vigorously against a President whose public
support is eroding, the Court's prestige and authority is of a broad institutional nature, and when the Court expends its store of capital it tends to do so
in a cumulative fashion. Since public antagonism, resistance, and retribution
appear to have a spill-over effect, if one or another of the Court's rulings
sparks a markedly hostile reaction, then the likelihood that subsequent judgments will be rejected is greatly increased even though the later invalidations
would, in themselves, be only mildly productive of popular resentment.
J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 156 (1980). Acting under such
constraints, the Court cannot possibly embark on a quest or crusade for "our shared
identity." To do so would be to court complete destruction, as should be evident from
a moment's reflection on Regan's suggestion that Roe and Lochner are models for constitutional adjudication. Regan, supra note 168, at 1113-14.
212. Regan, supra note 168, at 1119.
213. Id. at 1109.
214. Id. at 1109-10.
215. Id. at 1121.
216. The authors of a recent survey of poll results for the period 1926 to 1982
concerning ethnic and religious bias conclude, in part: "Ethnocentrism in both its
milder forms of ethnic pride and in-group cohesion and in the more virulent forms of
bigotry, discrimination, and xenophobia is still prominent in America (as in other
societies)." Smith & Dempsey, The Polls: Ethnic Social Distance and Prejudice, 47
PUB. OPINION Q. 584, 587 (1983).
Regan would reply that deontological liberalism is itself partly responsible for this
state of affairs, because, by presupposing pluralism, liberalism fosters it. Regan, supra
note 168, at 1122, (quoting M. SANDEL, supra note 166, at 153). The only possible
response to this argument is that it blinks reality. The notion that pluralism and
individualism in the United States are in any significant degree attributable to a theory
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cannot be found in the Constitution in the coherent, comprehensive form Regan's teleological theory requires.
At the root of Regan's error is his misconception of the
deontological bases of Ely's theory. It is not proceduralism
that defines Ely's theory as deontological; it is the denial that
the Constitution embodies any single theory of the good.
While Ely may fail to establish that the Constitution is primarily or fundamentally procedural in nature, the weaker claim
that the Constitution does not put forward a comprehensive,
coherent vision of human purpose is irrefutable. If it can be
refuted, again, the burden of doing so is on the teleologists
such as Regan.
V.

DEONTOLOGY, FALSIFIABILITY AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

What is the connection between advancing belief not falsifiable in principle, the establishment clause and the deontological Constitution? The answer lies in the Kantian roots of
deontological justice and in the nature of the political culture
the deontological Constitution supposes and supports. Both
the deontological Constitution and the test of falsifiability turn
on a particular conception of the person as autonomous, in
Kant's terms,2 1 7 or, as Rawls phrases it, free and equal. 1
A.

Freedom of Conscience and the Deontological
Constitution

The deontological Constitution is a procedural superstructure by which we effect the consensus and compromise necessary to democratic government. It does not suppose any
particular outcome of the procedures it sets up. Ely shows at
least that the Constitution's text is amenable to this reading,
but not that this reading is definitive. The question is, why
should we suppose the Constitution requires no particular outof politics or judicial review is simply absurd. The bare fact is that the population of
the United States is extraordinarily heterogeneous and grows more so every year. As
a rough indication, consider the pronounced shift in immigration from Europe and
Asia over the past three decades. For the period 1961-1970, the number of immigrants
from Europe and Asia, to the United States, respectively was 1,238,600 and 445,300.
For the period 1971-1980, Europe 801,300 and Asia 1,633,800. For the five year period
1981-1985, Europe 321,800 and Asia 1,376,300. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1988, at 10 (1988).
217. See I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 51, 54 (L. W.

Beck trans. 1959).
218. Rawls, supra note 6, at 233-34.
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comes, beyond the fact that writing a Constitution which does
so would be difficult?
The short answer is that only this interpretation of the
Constitution is consistent with our conviction that the citizens
living under it are free and equal.2 1 9 As noted above, the defining feature of a deontological theory as opposed to a teleological theory is the assumption that the right is prior to the good;
that the state should be ordered, not to realize some overarching conception of the proper ends of the human existence, but
to ensure that each person can pursue his own chosen ends.2 20
In any deontological theory, this priority of the right over the
good rests ultimately on Kant's categorical imperative. In its
second formulation the categorical imperative is: "Act so that
you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of
another, always as an end and never as a means only."'22 ' The
categorical imperative places the right over the good because to
arrange institutions so as to realize a given conception of
human purpose is to use persons as means to that realization.
In contrast, to order things so as to enable individuals to pursue their own ends is to treat them as ends in themselves.
The deontological Constitution shares this premise. The
Constitution does not decline to specify particular outcomes
only because to do so is difficult as a practical matter. The
Constitution does not even make the attempt because, even if
it were possible, to specify a particular result of our political
association would be unjust in this Kantian sense. It would
treat citizens as means to the attainment of that stipulated
result rather than as ends in themselves.
219. Those who assert teleological conceptions of the Constitution in support of
accommodationist readings of the establishment clause appear to share the premise

that freedom and equality are fundamental constitutional values. See Toscano, supra
note 3, at 209-10; Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 3, at 54-61; Comment, supra note
3,
at 333.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 190-99.
221. I. KANT, supra note 217, at 47. The basis of the categorical imperative is
Kant's conception of the person as autonomous.
The ground of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. Man
necessarily thinks of his own existence in this way; thus far it is a subjective
principle of human actions. Also every other rational being thinks of his

existence by means of the same rational ground which holds also for myself;
thus it is at the same time an objective principle from which, as a supreme

practical ground, it must be possible to derive all laws of the will. The

Id.

practical imperative, therefore, is the following: Act so that you treat
humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end
and never as a means only.
But see text accompanying notes 222-25.
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Deontological theories such as this do not incorporate
Kant's ethics as an unreconstructed whole.2 2 2 His defense of
the categorical imperative lacks force for us, because we share
neither his psychological assumptions nor his confidence in the
deduction of universally valid laws.223

Rawls, for example,

takes a fundamentally different approach in defending justice
as fairness, claiming only that his principles of justice224represent our "considered opinion in reflective equilibrium.
I should emphasize that what I have called the "real task" of
justifying a conception of justice is not primarily an epistemological problem. The search for reasonable grounds for
reaching agreement rooted in our conception of ourselves
and in our relation to society replaces the search for moral
truth interpreted as fixed by a prior and independent order
of objects and relations, whether natural or divine, an order
apart and distinct from how we conceive of ourselves. ....
What justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to
an order antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence
with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the tra-,
222. See Richards, Kantian Ethics and the Harm Principle: A Reply to John
Finnis, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1987).
223. See I. KANT, supra note 217, at 66-67.
224. J. RAWLs, supra note 166, at 20-21, 48-51, 120-22. See GOODMAN, FACT,
FICTION AND FORECAST 65-68 (1955).
Rawls argues that his two principles accurately describe justice because they
would be chosen by rational persons in the "original position"; that is, by those
selecting the basic features of a society in which they must live. J. RAWL,-supra note
166, at 17-22. He describes his use of considered opinion in reflective equilibrium in
this way:
In searching for the most favored description of [the original position] we
work from both ends. We begin by describing it so that it represents
generally shared and preferably weak conditions. We then see if these
conditions are strong enough to yield a significant set of principles ...
[P]resumably there will be discrepancies. . . . We can either modify the
account of the initial situation or we can revise our existing judgments, for
even the judgments we take provisionally as fixed points are liable to revision.
By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual
circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments and conforming them to
principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial
situation that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles
which match our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted. This state
of affairs I refer to as reflective equilibrium.
J. RAWLS, supra note 166, at 20.
In accord with this method, which makes no claims to transcendental truth, Rawls
has stressed that justice as fairness is not a theory of the person or a comprehensive
moral system, but only a political theory designed to describe the present best conception of justice in a late twentieth century constitutional democracy. See Rawls, supra
note 6, at 224-25.
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ditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable
225
doctrine for us.

225. Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures 1980,
at 77 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 515, 518-19 (1980) [hereinafter Rawls, Kantian
Constructivism]. See also Rawls, supra note 6, at 228-31.
It is here that Sandel's misreading of Rawls is most acute. As Amy Gutmann
writes: "Sandel interprets Rawls as . . . making a metaethical claim: that the
foundations of justice must be independent of all social and historical contingencies
without being transcendental." Gutmann, supra note 206, at 311-12 (discussing M.
SANDEL, supra note 166, at 16-17). Gutmann continues:
Why saddle Rawls's moral argument for the primacy of justice with this
meaning? To be sure, Rawls himself argues that "embedded in the principles
of justice ... is an ideal of the person that provides an Archimedean point for
judging the basic structure of society." But to translate this passage into a
claim that the grounds of justice can be noncontingent ignores most of what
Rawls says to explain his Archimedean point, the nature of justification, and
Kantian constructivism.
Id. (discussing J. RAWLS, supra note 168, at 584). See Rawls, Kantian Constructivism,
supra, at 564-67.
Sandel, however, anticipated Gutmann's objection to some extent by acknowledging that Rawls's method does replace Kant's transcendental premises with a more
empirical "hypothetical choice situation (the 'original position'), characterized by conditions meant to yield a determinate outcome fit for actual human beings." M. SANDEL,
supra note 166, at 14. Nevertheless, Sandel argues, Rawls'ss method of defining political principles cannot free him from the moral implications of his theory, particularly
the implied conception of the person.
[I]f reflective equilibrium truly works both ways, then the account of human
circumstance that emerges once reflective equilibrium is achieved can no
more be dispensed with as the incidental product of a fictive contrivance than
can the principles of justice themselves. Given the methodological symmetry
of the original position, we cannot regard one of its products as chaff to the
other's wheat, to be chucked away once the flour has been ground. We must
be prepared to live with the vision contained in the original position, mutual
disinterest and all, prepared to live with it in the sense of accepting its
description as an accurate reflection of human moral circumstance, consistent
with our understanding of ourselves.
M. SANDEL, supra note 166, at 48. But see infra note 231.
It is this "understanding of ourselves" with which Sandel is ultimately concerned.
His fundamental objection to Rawls's theory-and to any deontological theory-is that
it leaves no place for a particular kind of self-understanding that Sandel considers
valuable.
On this strong view, to say that the members of a society are bound by a sense
of community is not simply to say that a great many of them profess communitarian sentiments and pursue communitarian aims, but rather that they conceive their identity-the subject and not just the object of their feelings and
aspirations--as defined to some extent by the community of which they are a
part. For them, community describes not just what they have as fellow citizens but also what they are, not a relationship they choose (as in a voluntary
association) but an attachment they discover, not merely an attribute but a
constituent of their identity.
M. SANDEL, supra note 166, at 150.
Sandel sums up his critique with the observation that deontological liberalism
"forgets ... that when politics goes well, we can know a good in common that we cannot know alone." Id. at 183.
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Nevertheless, what defines justice as fairness in a deontological
theory of justice is the role the categorical imperative continues to play as part of that "deeper understanding of ourselves."
[C]itizens in a well-ordered society ... think of themselves

as self-originating sources of valid claims.. . People are selforiginating sources of claims in the sense that their claims
carry weight on their own without being derived from prior
duties or obligations owed to society or to other persons, or,
finally, as derived from, or assigned to, their particular social
role.... To take the extreme case, slaves are human beings

who are not counted as self-originating sources of claims at
their owners or in the
all; any such claims originate with
226
society.
in
class
certain
a
of
rights
The notion of a deontological Constitution makes similar
use of the categorical imperative. We make it part of our conception of the Constitution because it describes our best understanding of persons' relation to government. To live under a
deontological Constitution is to be assured that one is never in
anything like the condition of a slave. The Constitution leaves
me free to choose my place in society without reference to any
comprehensive system of human purpose which would assign
me one regardless of my own desires. As a corollary, whatever
demands I make under the Constitution I have a right to make
simply by virtue of my being a citizen, regardless of my place
in society. The Constitution, in short, places the right prior to
the good because to do otherwise would treat citizens living
under it as something other than free and equal. The Constitution is best described as a deontological Constitution because
such a Constitution is one we are prepared to accept as just.
Consider the alternative. Milton Regan, as I have pointed
out,2 27 omits any pertinent analysis of the Constitution in argu-

ing that the Supreme Court ought to take on the task of defining a national identity, purpose, and vision of the good; but
clearly the teleological conception of the Constitution is
implicit in what he writes. There is no better argument for the
deontological Constitution than the implications of Regan's
suggested teleological Constitution. Two passages in particular
are notable. "On the general level, Ely fails to appreciate that a
nation constitutes a community of shared values that enters
226. Rawls, supra note 225, at 534-44.
227. See supra text accompanying note 211.
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into individual identity. '228 "These considerations suggest that
substantive constitutional review provides perhaps the best
institutional opportunity for the discovery of those shared
meanings that enter into national, and thus individual identity."22 9 If individual identity is dependent on national identity,
what of individual dignity, worth, and responsibility?2 3 ° It is as
if, for Regan, the first half of this century is a blank.
The tribalism of the pan-movements with its concept of the
"divine origin" of one people owed part of its great appeal to
its contempt for liberal individualism, the ideal of mankind
and the dignity of man. No human dignity is left if the individual owes his value only to the fact that he happens to be
born a German or a Russian; but there is, in its stead, a new
coherence, a sense of mutual reliability among all members
of the people which indeed was very apt to assuage the rightful apprehensions of modern men as to what might happen
to them if, isolated individuals in an atomized society, they
were not protected by sheer numbers and enforced uniform
23
coherence. '

228. Regan, supra note 168, at 1109.
229. Id. at 1121. Regan, like Sandel, hopes to preserve the possibility of the person
constituted by community. The deontological Constitution is anathema as a
consequence, because it seems divisive. In placing the right over the good and in
emphasizing justice over community as a result, the deontological conception of the
Constitution breaks down communal bonds and "threatens our ability to realize and
act on the basis of our shared values." Id. at 1122-23.
230. Given Regan's reliance on Sandel, it is not surprising that Sandel's
discussions of constitutive community also have a disturbing ring:
More generally, Rawls's account rules out the possibility of what we might
call 'intersubjective' or 'intrasubjective' forms of self-understanding, ways of
conceiving the subject that do not assume its bounds to be given in advance
Intersubjective conceptions allow that in certain moral circumstances, the
relevant description of the self may embrace more than a single, individual
human being, as when we attribute responsibility or affirm an obligation to a
family or community or class or nation rather than to some particular human
being. Such conceptions are presumably what Rawls has in mind when he
rejects, 'for reasons of clarity among others,' what he calls 'an undefined
concept of community' and the notion that 'society is an organic whole' for
these suggest the metaphysically troubling side of Kant which Rawls is
anxious to replace.
M. SANDEL, supra note 166, at 62-63 (discussing J. RAWLS, supra note 166, at 264).
Rawls, however, declines to rely on such expansive notions of community for reasons quite different from those Sandel suggests, as Rawls later made clear. See infra
note 231.
231. H. ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 235 (1951). Arendt's use of the
term "atomized society" should not be misinterpreted. She represents it as a fear, not
a fact. Deontological liberalism in no way supposes that individuals are or should be
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To say that the deontological Constitution meets our best
completely cut off from other individuals or the community. It has often been
misrepresented as doing so.
For deontology insists that we view ourselves as independent selves,
independent in the sense that our identity is never tied to our aims and
attachments....
But we cannot regard ourselves as independent in this way without great
cost to those loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the
fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the
particular persons we are--as members of this family or community or a
nation or people, as bearers of this history, as sons and daughters of that
revolution, as citizens of this republic.
M. SANDEL, supra note 166, at 179.
Mark Tushnet makes similar allegations against liberalism in connection with his
theory of the religion clauses:
The historical origins of modern liberal political theory lay in philosophers'
reflections on the emergence of the unified nation-state. In order to create a
national entity strong enough to act in the emerging world polity and to
expand into the world market, the nation-state had to destroy the power of
intermediate institutions standing between the individual and the comprehenEstablishing the secular ruler's power would require diminishsive state ....
ing that of the priests.
Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701, 730-31 (1986); see also
Regan, supra note 168, at 1123; Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique
of Interpretivismand Neutral Principles,96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 783 (1983); Note, Reinterpreting the Religion Clauses: Constitutional Construction and Conceptions of the
Self, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1471 (1984). For a reply to the charges made in the earlier
article by Tushnet, see R. DWORKIN, supra note 201, at 440 n.19 (1986).
The mistake both Sandel and Tushnet make (aside from Tushnet's reifying the
state) is to infer too much from liberalism's choice of problem. Liberal theories
address the question of the proper relation between the individual and the state. Its
solution to that problem involves denying that the relationship should resemble certain others-the family, for example-but that should not be taken as denigrating
those other relationships or as asserting that human beings do not need such relationships or as suggesting that the state/individual relationship should supplant all others.
Liberalism simply takes seriously the notion that the state presents a unique moral
problem once it is subjected to constraints of liberty and equality.
It should also be stressed that justice as fairness is not intended as the application of a general moral conception to the basic structure of society, as if this
structure were simply another case to which that general moral conception is
The essential point is this: as a practical matter no general moral
applied ....
conception can provide a publicly recognized basis for a conception of justice
in a modern democratic state. The social and historical conditions of such a
state have their origins in the Wars of Religion following the Reformation and
the subsequent development of the principles of toleration, and in the growth
of constitutional government and the institutions of large industrial market
economies. These conditions profoundly affect the requirements of a workable conception of political justice: such a conception must allow for a diversity
of doctrines and the plurality of conflicting, and indeed incommeasurable,
conceptions of the good affirmed by members of existing democratic societies.
Rawls, supra note 6, at 225.
Sandel's error in this regard is reflected in his argument that Rawls's method of
reflective equilibrium commits him to advancing an impoverished conception of the
person in conjunction with his principles of justice. See supra note 225; M. SANDEL,
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understanding of the relation of the individual to the state is
thus to say more than might at first appear. We make the categorical imperative part of our understanding of the Constitution and give the right priority over the good not because we
can deduce it, with Kant, from human nature. We interpret
the Constitution that way because in light of our particular history and what we know now, we may well fear to do otherwise.
B.

The Establishment Clause and Falsifiabilityin Principle

The deontological Constitution, as I have described it, is a
Constitution which does not embody a comprehensive, coherent vision of human purpose. The Constitution supposes that
persons do properly choose their own ends and so establishes
procedures dedicated only to securing the consensus and compromise needed to carry out the necessary business of government. This suggests a certain rationale for the establishment
clause.
To adopt some program which subordinates individuals to
the attainment of some single, presumably "higher," good
would evidently run counter to the premises of the Constitution itself. Thus the establishment clause makes explicit what
is implicit in the deontological Constitution: that the government will not adopt a teleological program. The disavowal is
specific as well as explicit. Among the teleological programs
the government will not adopt are those advanced by any and
all religions.2 3 2
supra note 166, at 48. It is indeed true that in the process of seeking reflective equilibrium in defining principles of justice, we also define-in the mirror, so to speak-a
particular person. The same convictions about the heterogeneity of modern societies,
the value of liberty and necessary limits on the use of the state's coercive power which
shape principles of justice, also shape the person considering the question of justice as
one who recognizes heterogeneity, seeks liberty and values toleration. But the values
that person would treat as paramount in considering the question of justice in the state
are defined by the particular question at hand; other values that persons do hold and
do treat as paramount in deciding other critical questions are in no way impugned.
232. The notion that the clause makes an implicit premise of the Constitution an
explicit promise has a basis in history:
During the debate, Madison expressly disclaimed taking any position on the
question whether an amendment on the matter was needed. When Roger
Sherman declared that an amendment was "altogether unnecessary" because
Congress had no power "to make religious establishments," Daniel Carroll
replied that an amendment on the subject would "conciliate the minds of the
people to the Government," and Madison agreed with Carroll. Although
Madison would not say whether an amendment was necessary, he reminded
the House that some state conventions had expressed the fear that Congress
might establish a national religion by the exercise of a power under the
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However, to read the establishment clause as foreswearing
the teleological programs of religion leaves us somewhat short
of being able to decide actual cases. We seem to have a Zorach
problem.

233

If the establishment clause means no more than

that the government will not adopt a teleological program,
deciding actual cases threatens to involve us in questions of
uncalibrated degree. Granted that the government has not officially adopted a religious creed, how far may it go in advancing
one? Just like an established church, the adoption of a teleological program stands as a fixed point on the horizon of
impermissibility, but seems to be of no help in navigating the
immediate area.
The key to escaping that difficulty is the notion of belief
not falsifiable in principle. The test of falsifiability bars government's advancing such beliefs because to do so threatens
the adoption of a teleological program and because advancing
such beliefs in itself violates the categorical imperative to use
others as means, not ends.
Recall that a proposition not falsifiable in principle is one
which no empirical evidence will refute, but which some, perhaps much, evidence will confirm. Given that basic logical
structure, effective dissent from such claims is extremely difficult. One is limited to ai-guing that the evidence fails to confirm the proposition or that the proposition is false for
independent, non-empirical reasons; because certain premises
are incoherent or because the logic erected on them is faulty.
Neither approach will ordinarily succeed. Dissenting arguments over what the evidence confirms are unlikely to dent
the government position because, as Popper shows, confirming
evidence for any plausible claim is so abundant. In contrast,
deductive logic is determinate and such objections can be fatal
to the government position. For that very reason, however,
straightforward logical controversies are likely to be rare.
More often, the deductions on each side will be valid; the controversy will lie in first principles. To the extent that those
necessary and proper clause. In his great speech of June 8, 1789, when he
urged the House to consider amendments to protect "the great rights of
mankind," he repeated seven times that amendments, whether needed or not,
would allay public fears. People feared that Congress would establish a
national religion, and he had introduced an amendment calculated to appease
them.
L. LEVY, supra note 7, at 107.

233. See supra text accompanying notes 74-80.
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premises are non-empirical, the government's position again
will hold. Because government and dissenter share no common
ground and cannot appeal to empirical evidence, the controversy will remain a sterile clash of incommensurables.
Just on the surface, it should be apparent that such barren
disputes over non-falsifiable propositions, in which dissent cannot gain a foothold, thwart the political culture contemplated
by the deontological Constitution. If the beliefs advanced by
an existing government are irrefutable, critical participation in
government is impossible. 3 4 More specifically, government
capacity to preclude dissent in this manner is a necessary condition to the adoption or advancement of a teleological program. Claims about ultimate ends are characteristically nonempirical and non-falsifiable, simply because human experience is contingent and fragmentary and cannot fully support
such claims. In reading the establishment clause to preclude
the advancement of belief not falsifiable in principle, the test
of falsifiability precludes the adoption or advancement of the
teleological programs of religion, and with it the use of citizens
as means, not ends.
At this point, it might be argued that in anticipating and
seeking to prevent the preclusion of critical participation in
government, the test of falsifiability still displays some of
Zorach's defect. What the test seeks to prevent may be a
remote eventuality. However, the problem with Zorach's
approach was not just that it sought to forestall remote effects,
but that it framed the establishment clause question as one of
degree without giving a scale on which to make such judgments. The test of falsifiability, on the other hand, does not
demand that we gauge small and large steps toward the adoption of a teleological program. Instead, it identifies and eliminates a single necessary condition to such an undertaking: the
234. A similar connection between what I call teleological programs and belief not
falsifiable in principle is noted by O'Hear in his discussion of Popper's political
philosophy:
Someone who wishes to impose a Utopian blueprint on society will tend to
overlook the initial effects of his revolutionary actions, which may well be
unpopular and undesirable, because of his belief in the ultimate correctness of
his theory about the ideal state. Indeed, he has to become dictatorial, if he is
not to modify his blueprint against experience in such a way as to destroy its
integrity. He has, in other words, to treat his blueprint as unfalsifiable, to
treat human beings and their reactions as being tested by it, rather than vice
versa.
A. O'HEAR, supra note 14, at 157.
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capacity to advance belief not falsifiable in principle. The test
of falsifiability requires governments operating under the
deontological Constitution to stay true to the Constitution's
intrinsically open nature by means of a single, unequivocal
requirement.2 3 5
The argument for the test of falsifiability can also be
framed in more formal, Kantian terms; that is, as a corollary to
the categorical imperative. As described above, a government
which advances belief not falsifiable in principle effectively
precludes dissent. In doing so, it makes a demand on the individual which the deontological Constitution abjures: to believe
without the freedom to change one's mind; to accept immutable truth and rest content. The person becomes a vessel of
belief rather than a participant in knowledge; that is, a means
rather than an end in himself. In that sense, advancing belief
not falsifiable in principle violates the assumption that citizens
under the Constitution are free and equal, an assumption ordinarily summed up, where evidence and belief are concerned, in
the term freedom of conscience. Under the test of falsifiability, legislation violates the establishment clause when it
denies what the Constitution's basic structure is designed to
preserve: an equal liberty to choose one's own ends according
to the dictates of conscience.
Madison himself stated the principle in his Memorial and
Remonstrance:
[T]he Bill violates that equality which ought to be the basis
of every law, and which is more indispensable in proportion
as the validity or expediency of any law is more liable to be
impeached. "If all men are by nature equally free and
independent," all men are to be considered as entering into
235. It might still be objected that there is some conceivable teleological program
that does not rely on any proposition not falsifiable in principle or that not all
propositions not falsifiable in principle entail teleological programs. The only possible
response to such an objection, which so far as it goes is well-founded, is to say that the
test of falsifiability is a legal standard, which, like any other, relies on common
experience and sound judgment. Legal rationality is empirical, instrumental,
pragmatic, inductive, or rhetorical-but never deductive, never mathematical. Stick,
supra note 6, at 345-50, 363-67; White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of
Culturaland Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1985). It is not possible to define
a universal criterion which will delineate a discrete class of actions which will always
necessarily violate the establishment clause. Law just does not work that way. But
some instrumental legal criteria are better than others. Some give a more convincing
account of their object and draw a tighter connection between the object and the
formula used. The test of falsifiability claims an advantage over Zorach and Lemon on
that ground.
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Society on equal conditions; as relinquishing no more, and
therefore retaining no less, one than another, of their natural rights. Above all, are they to be considered as retaining
an "equal title to the free exercise of Religion according to
the dictates of conscience." Whilst we assert for ourselves a
freedom to embrace, to profess, and to observe, the Religion
which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny an
equal freedom to those whose minds
have not yielded to the
23 6
evidence which has convinced us.
A government advancing belief not falsifiable in principle violates this precept. A government advancing such belief denies
the individual the right to consider and reject any particular
belief, regardless of the fact that others have been persuaded
by it and may hold the strongest possible convictions on the
matter. In short, a government advancing belief not falsifiable
in principle violates freedom of conscience and thus the establishment clause.
This invalidating effect is perfectly illustrated in Aguillard. What determines the legitimacy of the Creationism Act
under the clause is the difference between science and creationism-the manner of belief involved in each, and the consequent difference in the nature of governmental action in
advancing each.
A scientific fact is always provisional, amounting to no
more than the conclusion that a hypothesis has not yet been
falsified, despite more or less rigorous attempts to do so.23 7 By
their very nature the claims of science are advanced with a
standing invitation to challenge, to falsification. In advancing
scientific explanations in its schools, Louisiana advanced this
invitation as well.
According to its proponents, the Creationism Act would
have had an entirely different effect. Under the Act, Louisiana
would have advanced "the truth" pure and simple. The creationists appropriated the name of science precisely for its sup238
posed capacity to establish final, incontrovertible truth.
Their own account of their beliefs showed that falsifiability in
principle played no role in their thinking. 239 Despite its
pretensions to "academic freedom," the Act simply offered a
236. 1 J. MADISON,
(emphasis added).
237. See supra text
238. See supra text
239. See supra text

LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 164 (1865)
accompanying notes 139-52.
accompanying notes 160-61.
accompanying notes 154-59.
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choice between two dogmatic positions, with no invitation to
the probing challenge that constitutes real science.
This is a critical difference in light of the deontological
Constitution and the political culture it cultivates. The Constitution's open structure contains an invitation like that of science; an invitation to critical participation. The Constitution
makes no claims concerning the ultimate end of our political
association. Existing law under such a constitution represents
our present best judgment of how to arrange matters which
concern the state, but that judgment is not a final judgment.
Any part of the existing order is open to critique and change.
Moreover, the critique and the impetus for change can come
from any direction. No argument is ruled out in advance, since
to do so would violate the basic assumption that citizens are
free and equal under the Constitution.
Because science asserts only propositions which are falsifiable in principle, the state's supporting it does not violate this
last requirement; nothing is ruled out in advance. The effect of
the Creationism Act was quite different in that it ruled out
almost everything in advance. As the testimony of its supporters made clear, the Act was not an invitation to question or to
challenge, but instead a prescription for belief. As such, the
Act violated the establishment clause because it violated fundamental principles of liberty and equality on which the Constitution and the clause rest. The Act was invalid under the
establishment clause because it advanced belief not falsifiable
in principle.
The test of falsifiability's grounding in the fundamental
congruence between the deontological Constitution and falsifiable belief permits the test to escape an important objection
that it could not escape were it founded only on a purported
neutrality between religion and non-religion. Teaching evolution instead of creationism is not a neutral choice. The two
theories represent utterly incommensurable ways of understanding the world, and the choice between them has profound
consequences for the sort of society we will have. Creationism
permits one to assert duties, as a citizen, to a Creator; evolution
does not. Those whose religious beliefs entail such legallyenforceable duties feel mocked, and rightly so, by the claim
that their loss is a consequence of governmental neutrality
toward religion.
One advantage of the test of falsifiability is its frank
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acknowledgement that the preference for secular ways of
understanding does matter. More important is its capacity to
justify that preference. Evolution ought to be taught in public
schools and creationism should not be, precisely because the
latter implies duties to a Creator. If a public school advances
religious belief and its implied duties, the natural inference is
that those duties are the duties of citizens. The test of falsifiability frankly prefers the secular on the ground that it is
no business of the state to keep people in their proper places in
a divine plan by enforcing the duties that plan entails. Support
for the secular-for indeterminate, empirical, critical
approaches to the world, as exemplified in science-is permissible under the Constitution because secular belief does not
imply such a plan or make individual dignity or worth depend
on whether and how well one fills one's place in it. The test of
falsifiability is designed to capture this respect for conscience
for establishment clause purposes.
VI.

APPLYING AND REFINING THE TEST OF FALSIFIABILITY

Having completed the derivation of the test of falsifiability
from its premises in deontological justice, it remains to refine
and defend the test. Applying the test's definition of invalidating effects to the cases subjects it to a useful strain, exposing
ambiguities, potential weaknesses and, I hope, hidden
strengths. The defense advanced in this Part will involve discussions of two major controversies in establishment clause
theory as well as a demonstration of the test's capacity to bring
order to the cases.
A.

Engel and Abington as Paradigm Cases

By defining invalidating effects as I have done, we can
treat Engel and Abington-instead of Everson and Zorach-as
paradigm cases. Defining invalidating effects as government's
advancing belief not falsifiable in principle taps the root of
those cases' intuitive appeal. The young minds to which the
Bible readings and prayers were addressed were vulnerablecaptive, trusting, and lacking in perspective. Standard establishment clause analysis relegates that vulnerability to a minor
role as a measure of the threat of an established church. The
test of falsifiability, however, treats the vulnerability itselfnot just its possible role in someday establishing a church-as a
concern of the establishment clause. The children praying and
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reading the Bible in Engel and Abington were not being taught
to think critically, as presumably they were in their science
and civics classes; instead,
240 they were being taught to accept
authoritative assertions.

While that might be proper, even

necessary, in an authoritarian state, it is not proper in a constitutional democracy because it so clearly runs counter to the
Constitution's conception of a free and equal citizenry.2 4 '
Other cases directly involving the teaching of children display the same abhorrence of indoctrination evinced in Engel
and Abington. This quality in Epperson served as my starting
point; in particular, Justice Fortas's use of Meyer, a substantive
due process case, to raise the issue of indoctrination in the
establishment clause context.2 4 2 In Aguillard the Court invalidated the Act on the secular purpose prong alone and did so in
the strongest terms, summarily declaring creation science a
sham.243 Despite the weakness of the opinion's logic, it derives
force from the same intuitive source Engel and Abington do.
Children should be taught to think, not to believe.
Stone v. Graham invalidated a law requiring the posting of
the Ten Commandments in Kentucky classrooms in a per
curiam opinion discussing only the secular purpose prong.2 4 4
Like Aguillard, Stone is a curt, unequivocal condemnation of
indoctrination in the tradition of Engel and Abington. This is
apparent not only in the Court's summary disposition of the
case, but in the reasoning of the opinion. While the Court condemned the posting of the Commandments on classroom
walls-where they could serve only as an admonishment to
obedience-the opinion distinguishes a non-authoritarian use
of the same text. "This is not a case in which the Ten Commandments are integrated into the school curriculum, where
the Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study
of history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the
like.

'2 45

Treated as intellectual history, the Commandments

would be advanced, not for adherence, but for discussion; that
is, as propositions falsifiable in principle. In that role, their use
240. Of course, they learned by rote too-arithmetic and spelling for example.
The difference is that arithmetic and spelling form no part of a religion. See infra text
accompanying notes 262-265.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 190-99 & 217-31.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 113-24.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 127-33.
244. 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).
245. Id. at 42.

1989]

The Establishment ause

would not violate the establishment clause.2 46
This possibility of proper and improper uses of the Ten
Commandments suggests that applying the test of falsifiability
in a particular case will sometimes require a factual record on
the implementation of the subject laws. In Stone, that was not
necessary because it was clear from the face of the Kentucky
law that the Commandments would not be the subject of
searching, critical study. Posting the Commandments on the
wall was neither an obvious nor a finely-tailored means to that
end. In other cases, however, it will not be clear from the face
of the law that its effect is to advance belief not falsifiable in
principle. In those cases, an adequate factual record from
below will be required.24 7
The case of Bowen v. Kendrick 248 is a perfect illustration.
The Court considered whether the Adolescent Family Life Act
(AFLA) violated the establishment clause because it permitted
246. This is not to say that, in order to satisfy the test of falsifiability, the
Commandments would have to be treated scientifically, only that they would have to
be treated critically. This raises an important point concerning my adaptation of
Popper's thought. Popper formulated falsifiability in principle as a criterion for
distinguishing science from other branches of knowledge. Here, I use the concept to
distinguish a broader class of intellectual activity: that which is consistent with the
establishment clause as opposed to that which, when advanced by government, violates
it.
This use of the concept is valid because Popper himself has recognized that
falsifiability as a criterion of science is "a special case of the wider problem of
demarcating criticizable from non-criticizable theories." Popper, Remarks on the
Problems of Demarcation and of Rationality, in PROBLEMS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE 95 (I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave eds. 1968). Indeed, O'Hear argues that
falsifiability is much more successful as a criterion of critical rationality generally than
it is as a criterion demarcating science in particular. A. O'HEAR, supra note 14, at 11011. I employ the concept only in the former role, arguing in essence that government
support of critical activity is legitimate and that government support of non-critical
activity is not.
247. This necessity indicates why I have chosen to refer to "belief" not falsifiable
in principle, rather than merely "propositions" not falsifiable in principle. The test's
definition concerns, not just the logical form of propositions in legislation, but how
they are presented and acted upon once the legislation is put into execution.
The
word "belief" conveys the latter sense, where the word "propositions" would not. In
this too, my use of falsifiability is consistent with Popper's own:
I admit that my criterion of falsifiability does not lead to an unambiguous
classification. Indeed it is impossible to decide, by analyzing its logical form,
whether a system of statements is a conventional system of irrefutable
implicit definitions, or whether it is a system which is empirical in my sense:
that is a refutable system ....
Only with reference to the methods applied to
a theoretical system is it at all possible to ask whether we are dealing with a
conventionalist or an empirical theory.
K. POPPER, LOGIC, supra note 14, at 81-82.
248. 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
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religious organizations to participate in a program promoting
chastity as a means of preventing teenage pregnancy. 2 49 The
Court held that the AFLA was not invalid on its face, but
remanded to determine whether it was invalid as applied.2 5 °
The Court directed the District Court to determine whether
the AFLA aid had been used "to fund 'specifically religious
activit[ies] in an otherwise substantially secular setting.' ,251
The real significance of Bowen, however, lies not in the
fact that the Court remanded for fact-finding, but in the sort of
facts which, if found, would invalidate the AFLA. As Justice
Rehnquist wrote on behalf of the majority: "Here it would be
relevant to determine, for example, whether the Secretary has
permitted AFLA grantees to use materials that have an explicitly religious content or are designed to inculcate the views of a
particular religious faith. 25 2 The dissenters were convinced
that the statute was invalid on its face, but the invalidating
effect they had in mind was the same. As Justice Blackmun
wrote:
There is a very real and important difference between running a soup kitchen or a hospital, and counseling pregnant
teenagers on how to make the difficult decisions facing
them. The risk of advancing religion at public expense, and
of creating an appearance that the government is endorsing
the medium and the message, is much greater when the religious organization is directly engaged in pedagogy, with the
express intent of shaping belief and changing behavior, than
where it is neutrally dispensing medication, food, or
2 53
shelter.
Despite the clear and substantial differences between the
majority and dissenters in Bowen, then, there was a point of
consensus. They differed over fine points of confusion wrought
by Everson and Zorach, but all nine Justices agreed that the
inculcation of religious belief would violate the clause.
The test of falsifiability rests on just this point of unanimity. The test's prohibition on government's advancing belief
not falsifiable in principle differs from the Court's unanimous
condemnation of inculcating religious belief only in its being
249. Id. at 2566-67.
250. Id. at 2580-81.
251. Id. at 2580.

252. Id. at 2581.
253. Id. at 2591 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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formulated with reference to science and the deontological
Constitution. Bowen shows that the cases which the test treats
as paradigms are indeed that. Engel and Abington alone
account for the Court's unanimity regarding the inculcation of
religious belief, or, in my terms, government's advancing belief
not falsifiable in principle.
B. Extending the Test of FalsifiabilityBeyond
the Paradigm Cases
Extending the test's definition of invalidating effects
beyond the core of cases involving a threat of indoctrination,
however, presents a problem. One reason freedom of conscience has been slighted as an establishment clause value is
the simple fact that, where outright religious indoctrination is
not threatened, no individual's conscience is directly at stake.
In such cases, freedom of conscience naturally tends to fade
into the background of the analysis.
Conscience does not cease to be a concern of the clause,
however. As I discuss more fully below, Lynch v. Donnelly did
not present a case of religious indoctrination, but consider one
prominent scholar's response to the opinion:
Let me report my own immediate and less immediate emotional responses to Lynch: At first, it seemed to me a simple
slap in the face, a statement that my sensibilities as a Jew
counted for nothing. One might put up with that sort of
thing from the Pawtucket City Council. After all, I have
never been in Pawtucket, and I appreciate the values of federalism enough to understand that I could not fairly be troubled when I choose to visit cities and towns whose residents
have decided to celebrate their own homogeneity because I
know that I have my own home town to return to, where my
sensibilities are taken seriously. When the Supreme Court
endorses Pawtucket's action, however, it denies me that
option. It says to me, in effect, "If you don't like it here,
why don't you go someplace else?" And "here" means, not
Pawtucket, but the United States.2 4
Both consistency and coherence can be improved by taking
Professor Tushnet's reaction to Lynch seriously, and treating
254. Tushnet, Religion and Theories of Constitutional Interpretation,33 LOYOLA
L. REV. 221, 222 (1987). I do not understand Tushnet to be arguing that federalism
could justify the establishment clause violation. He would not be so insensitive to
Pawtucket's Jews.
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freedom of conscience as the prime establishment clause value.
The test of falsifiability is designed to do just that.
The test's key term in this regard is the word "advance."
The word has a pedagogical sense which predominates in the
paradigm cases: to put forward for consideration or to inculcate. In other contexts, however, "advance" means to move
forward in practice, to strengthen and perpetuate. In the
course of applying the test of falsifiability, this ambiguity surfaces as soon as we move away from the paradigm cases. The
ambiguity is not vicious, however, because acknowledging the
ambiguity and embracing both terms is precisely what enables
the test to reach beyond the paradigm cases and decide those
cases which do not involve actual instruction in religious belief.
For the purposes of the test of falsifiability, then, "advance"
means both putting forward or inculcating belief, and strengthening or perpetuating certain beliefs through the use of the
state's prestige or its coercive and fiscal power.
Lynch is a good illustration of the test's scope given this
broad definition of "advance." The District Court found as a
fact that Pawtucket's purpose was not to provide religious
instruction.2 5 5 On the face of things it seems obvious that the
creche did not inculcate ideas in the way Bible reading, school
prayer or the posting of the Ten Commandments do. By
presenting religious ideas-immaculate conception in the figure of the Virgin, the divinity of Christ in the adoration of the
Magi-the city assisted in their propogation by placing its prestige and fiscal power behind them. If the creche "advanced"
belief not falsifiable in principle, it was in the second sense
stated above: to strengthen and perpetuate. The test of falsifiability would overrule Lynch on that ground.
The test's employing this broad sense of "advance" not
only permits it to reach beyond the paradigm cases; it keeps
the test true to those paradigm cases, just as they are true to
Madison's conception of the clause. The state may not place its
prestige or coercive power in the service of belief not falsifiable
in principle: "Because it is proper to take alarm at the first
experiment on our liberties. ' ' 25

The alarm is justified, not by

remote threats, but by the immediate violation of freedom of
conscience. The alarm is raised by our judgment that the
state's using its power to inculcate, strengthen or perpetuate
255. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
256. J. MADISON, supra note 236, at 163.
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belief not falsifiable in principle violates deeply held convictions about the state, belief, and the injunction to use others as
ends, not as means. Contrary to Zorach's premise, the establishment clause does not present questions of degree.25 7 The
injustice it condemns is the same on any scale.
However, while the test's embracing the second sense of
"advance" permits it to reach beyond the core of cases
involving a threat of religious indoctrination, that extended reach
itself creates certain difficulties. One of these is the possibility
that the test of falsifiability would require governmental hostility to religion.

I address that concern below. 25 8"

Another

problem has to do with the general definition of "religion" for
establishment clause purposes, and the possibility that the test
reaches beyond the proper scope of the clause.
Consider the prohibition on public funding of abortion at
issue in Harris v. McRae.259 The court held that the Hyde
Amendment withstood scrutiny under the clause, despite the
fact that it embodied the Roman Catholic Church's and protestant fundamentalists' position on abortion. 2 0 The Court held
that the congruence was a coincidence, making the benefit to
religion permissibly incidental. Justice Stewart's opinion
argued: "The Hyde Amendment, as the District Court noted,
is as much a reflection of "traditionalist" values toward abortion, as it is an embodiment of the views of any particular reli-

gion."' 261

What

this

argument

ignores,

first,

is

that

the

"traditionalist" position is the product of religious traditions,
i.e., religious dogma; and, second, that regardless of whether
they are nominally religious, those "traditional" beliefs are not
falsifiable in principle. The Hyde Amendment supposed some
absolutely grounded, immutable truth and advanced it at the
expense of individual citizens: poor women who, in the exercise of individual conscience, had decided to terminate their
pregnancies. As a violation of conscience, the Hyde Amendment fares no better than Bible reading or school prayer. As
such, it ought to have been invalidated under the establishment clause.
Suppose, however, that the Court's characterization of the
Hyde Amendment was correct; that while the law advanced
257. 343 U.S 306, 314 (1952).
258. See infra text accompanying notes 267-90.

259. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
260. Id. at 318-19.

261. Id. at 319.
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belief not falsifiable in principle, those beliefs were not religious, but something else. If the test's proposed definition of
invalidating effects will invalidate legislation that cannot be
called "religious", then the definition seems too broad; it seems
to reach beyond the proper scope of the clause barring establishments of religion.
Put another way, Harris raises the question: What is the
relation between the definition of religion under the establishment clause and the term "not falsifiable in principle"? The
application of the test of falsifiability in Harris seems to suggest that non-falsifiability in principle is a sufficient defining
condition of religion under the establishment clause; that is,
that there is no category such as Justice Stewart's "traditionalist" which is both: 1) not religion, and, 2) characterized by
belief not falsifiable in principle. In this light, again, the test
seems overbroad. Despite the Hyde Amendment's obvious
roots in religious doctrine, it seems premature to conclude that
there can never be a set of beliefs which is both not falsifiable
in principle and not religious. For example, Popper argued
that Freudian psychology is not falsifiable in principle. It is
also obviously not religious.
In addressing this issue, the logical place to start is with a
definition of religion for constitutional purposes. Without
entering into the long controversy over defining religion-an
issue which arises primarily in free exercise cases-the best
approach seems to be that proposed in separate articles by
Kent

Greenawalt

and George

C. Freeman. 262

Following

Wittgenstein, Greenawalt and Freeman abandon the attempt
to define religion by isolating necessary and sufficient traits or
conditions. They propose instead to look at religion as a family
of characteristics. 26 3 As Greenawalt writes:

Our society identifies what is indubitably religious largely by
reference to their beliefs, practices, and organizations. These
include: a belief in God; a comprehensive view of the world
and human purposes; a belief in some form of afterlife; communication with God through ritual acts of worship and
through corporate and individual prayer; a particular perspective on moral obligations derived from a moral code or
from a conception of God's nature; practices involving repen262. Freeman, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of
"Religion" 71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983); Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in
ConstitutionalLaw, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 753 (1984).
263. Freeman, supra note 262, at 1549-59; Greenawalt, supra note 262, at 763-64.

1989]

The Establishment Clause

tance and forgiveness of sins; "religious" feelings of awe,
guilt and adoration; the use of sacred texts; and organization
to facilitate the corporate aspects of religious practice and to
promote and perpetuate beliefs and practices....
Should any single feature be absent, religion, as far as
general usage is concerned, could still exist. ... Religions
need not share any single common feature, because no single
feature is indispensible. 2"
The test of falsifiability seems to run against this sensible
approach by treating non-falsifiability in principle as a necessary feature of religion, a sufficient feature, or both.
The difficulty can be remedied by a further refinement of
the test of falsifiability; one which converts the notion of nonfalsifiability from a borrowed term of philosophy of science
into a term of art for establishment clause purposes. Under
the test's proposed definition of invalidating effects, non-falsifiability does not form any part of the definition of religion.
The relation between the two is just the reverse: religion
forms part of the definition of non-falsifiability. As used in the
test of falsifiability, the term "belief not falsifiable in principle" refers to propositions which are not in principle open to
testing and revision, as described by Popper," 5 and which are,
in addition, accompanied by indicia of religion, as described by
Greenawalt.
This revision in the definition of non-falsifiability prevents
the test's sweeping too broadly. Incorporating indicia of religion into the test of falsifiability limits the reach of the test to
only those matters which are the proper province of the establishment clause; that is, matters of religion. To return to the
example of Harris, the Hyde Amendment would be invalid
under the test's proposed definition of invalidating effects
because its non-falsifiable "traditionalist" premises clearly had
roots in religion; not just because they were non-falsifiable in
Popper's sense. The departure from Popper's sense of the
term is obviously necessary. "Belief not falsifiable in principle" naturally acquires new meaning in its role as an establishment clause term of art.

264. Greenawalt, supra note 262, at 767-68.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 139-52.
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EliminatingAccommodations of Religion Not Required
by the Free Exercise ause

As I have noted, extending the test of falsifiability beyond
the core of cases involving a threat of indoctrination suggests
another problem: the possibility that the test might require
governmental hostility to religion. On the contrary, however,
the test requires only that we abandon the notion that the
establishment clause must tolerate accommodations of religion
which are not actually required by the free exercise clause.
The doctrine of religious accommodation under the establishment clause proclaims a neutral territory between the religion clauses. The theory is that some legislation beneficial to
religion is neither demanded by the free exercise clause nor
prohibited by the establishment clause. It was first explicitly
formulated in Walz: "The limits of permissible state accommodation of religion are by no means co-extensive with the
noninterference mandated by the free exercise clause. To
equate the two would be to deny a national heritage with roots
in the Revolution itself."2'6 6 As the second sentence indicates,
Justice Douglas's dictum in Zorach that "[w]e are a religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being"2'6 7 is a
central premise of the doctrine. The fundamental error in that
claim-the notion that the Constitution embodies any teleology, christian or otherwise-has been examined at length
above.2 6 In the literature surrounding the clause, the leading
argument for continued and expanded accommodation rests on
a similar historical premise: that the Constitution was
designed to promote and rely on individual virtue.2 69 That
premise too is invalid, for the same reasons.2 °
Aside from the ideal of a virtuous Christian nation, accom266. 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
267. 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). The most recent accommodation case, Corporationof
the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, offers no analysis on the point beyond quoting Walz.
107 S. Ct. 2862, 2867 (1987).
268. See supra text accompanying notes 190-216.
269. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 17.
270. See supra note 201. To judge from The Federalist, the Framers were far
more intent on coping with heterogeneity-the problem of "factions"-than with
inculcating virtue. That same preoccupation is at the center of the deontological
Constitution. See supra text accompanying notes 190-216.

McConnell argues that the government should be allowed to promote "free
exercise values" just as it has been allowed to promote "equal protection values." The
answer to that is that the equal protection clause has no limiting companion clause

comparable

to the establishment

clause.

Adams

& Gordon, The Doctrine of

Accommodation in the Jurisprudenceof the Religion Clauses, 37 DE PAUL L. REV. 317,
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modations doctrine is supported by a tacit assumption, present
since Everson, that establishment clause standards should to
some extent anticipate and incorporate the demands of the
free exercise clause. The "incidental benefits" theory is in
essence a rule that, in considering possibly illegitimate benefits
to religion, the Court will err on the side of aiding religion
rather than risk infringing on its exercise. Hence Justice
Black's insistence that general governmental benefits should
not be denied to believers for fear of invidious discrimination."' This margin of error in applying the establishment
clause is the same margin between the clauses where "accommodations" are to be found. 2
The result of Justice Black's approach, however, is to
slight the legitimate demands of the establishment clause
itself. For example, depriving parochial schools of fire and
police protection would indeed be an act of hostility by the government, but the notion of "incidental benefits" has authorized
much more than non-hostility: among other things, the lending of school books in Allen. Allen's result, however, not only
336 n.98 (1988); Note, PermissibleAccommodations of Religion, 96 YALE L.J. 1149-1150
n.19 (1987).
Generally: "The inevitable tendency of accommodationism as it is currently
practiced-on an ad hoc, unprincipled basis-is towards religious favoritism, overt or
covert, of mainstream religions .... Note, Developments in the Law-Religion and
the State, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1607, 1638 (1987).
271. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16, 18 (1947).
272. The continuing plague of Everson and accommodations is well illustrated in
the recent case of Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989). The case concerned
a tax exemption for religious periodicals. Justice Scalia demonstrated persuasively
that the exemption fell squarely within the rule of Walz-but he did so in dissent. Id.
at 909-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Writing for a plurality, Justice Brennan escaped Walz
by stressing, perhaps exaggerating, the extent to which "the benefits derived by
religious organizations [in Walz] flowed to a large number of nonreligious groups as
well." Id. at 897; see id. at 911 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
In other words, Justice Brennan demanded that religious benefits be 'very
incidental'-that they be accompanied by substantial secular effects. In doing so, he
compressed the margin for accommodations, ultimately limiting accommodations to
measures required by the free exercise clause. See id. at 899-900. Justice Scalia argued
cogently that Justice Brennan had undermined accommodations doctrine by his
construction of "incidental benefits." Id. at 912. Scalia himself would treat the two
tests as distinct: a benefit's not being incidental would not preclude its being a
permissible accommodation. Id. at 913. But what made Justice Brennan's attack
possible was the fact that accommodations doctrine and the incidental benefits test
both rest on the assumption that establishment clause analysis should anticipate the
demands of free exercise. By casting the case as one of "incidental benefits" and then
denying that premise, Brennan was able to avoid the demands of both Walz and
accommodations doctrine.
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was not required by the free exercise clause; it violated the
establishment clause, as Meek and Wolman later made clear.
The test of falsifiability rejects the validity of religious
accommodations altogether on the ground that they lack constitutional warrant and lead to the violation of conscience.
While the test eliminates accommodations, however, it is not
premised on an unconstitutional hostility to religion. Consider
Everson again. The rationale for Justice Black's "incidental
benefits" theory is, taken alone, perfectly reasonable:
[P]arents might refuse to risk their children to the serious
danger of traffic accidents going to and from parochial
schools, the approaches to which were not protected by
policemen. Similarly, parents might be reluctant to permit
their children to attend schools which the state had cut off
from such general government services as ordinary police
and fire protection, connections for sewage disposal, public
highways and sidewalks. Of course, cutting off church
schools from these services, so separate and so indisputably
marked off from the religious function, would make it far
more difficult for the schools to operate. But such is obviously not the purpose of the First Amendment. That
Amendment requires the state to be neutral in its relations
with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does
not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no
more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor
them.2 73
The test of falsifiability appears to cross the boundary between
neutrality and hostility. Its definition of invalidating effects
has no natural lower limit which would permit these seemingly genuine incidental benefits to religion. Standing alone,
the test would indeed require cutting off fire and police protection to parochial schools on the ground that such benefits preserve the schools' viability and thereby advance belief not
falsifiable in principle.
In considering the validity of the test of falsifiability, however, we must bear in mind that it does not stand alone. The
test sweeps broadly on its own terms, but an important justification for its doing so is this: where a genuine conflict between
the free exercise clause and the establishment clause arises
under the test of falsifiability, the free exercise clause will
control.
273. 330 U.S. at 17-18.
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Taking Everson's examples, the test of falsifiability standing alone would require withdrawing police and fire protection
and utilities service from parochial schools. However, such
deprivations would violate the free exercise clause. 4 Under
the test as limited above, the free exercise clause would control
and the basic services would be provided. Providing transportation to parochial school students, however, is in no way
required by the free exercise clause.2 75 The test of falsifiability
274. Free exercise analysis proceeds under a two-part test. The religious plaintiff
must show a burden on sincerely held religious convictions. If he succeeds, then the
government must show a state interest sufficiently compelling to override the free
exercise interest. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1971); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 403 (1962). The Court in Sherbert held that South Carolina could not deny
unemployment benefits to a worker who had been discharged for refusing to work on
her Sabbath.
Here not only is it apparent that appellant's declared ineligibility for benefits
derives solely from the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to
forego that practice is unmistakable. The ruling forces her to choose between
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand,
and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on
the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind
of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against
appellant for her Saturday worship.
374 U.S. at 404. See also, Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm., 480 U.S. 1136
(1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1980).
The withdrawal of fire and police protection and utilities from parochial schools
would burden free exercise by forcing religious parents to risk their children's health
and safety in order to exercise the right to a sectarian education. See Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The burden could never be justified, since any conceivable governmental interest could be served by more narrowly drawn, less burdensome
means.
Professor Ira Lupu has proposed an analysis of the burden requirement under
which free exercise interests are defined by reference to analogous interests in person
or property cognizable under the common law. Lupu, Where Rights Begin.: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARv. L. REV. 933 (1989). The
latter would include universally available governmental benefits which are "entitlements" and thus property for due process purposes. Id. at 978. See Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). Applied
to the Everson hypotheticals, the withdrawal of fire and police protection and utilities
would constitute a burden on free exercise because those governmental benefits are
"entitlements."
275. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
In Lyng, Native American tribes challenged the federal government's right to build a
road through government-owned land which was also sacred land. The majority held
that no burden was imposed on free exercise of religion, because the road had "no
tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs .... " Id. at
1326. Similarly, the failure or refusal to provide free passage on city buses would have
no such coercive effect.
Professor Lupu argues persuasively that the "coercion" test applied by the Lyng
majority is too broad. Lupu, supra note 274, at 961-63. Even under Lupu's proposed
alternative, however, refusing the bus rides at issue in Everson would not violate the
free exercise clause. That governmental benefit could not be considered an
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would therefore bar such a benefit to religion.
The test's expressly deferring to the free exercise clause is
not only a necessary limitation; it is a critical part of its advantage over existing law. The test states a strong, even extreme,
establishment clause standard that expressly defers to the free
exercise clause, but only where necessary and never in
advance. By definition, the religion clauses share a single,
common border. The test of falsifiability eliminates Everson's
redundant and disastrous anticipation of free exercise claims
and Zorach's teleological "Christian nation" justification for
religious accommodation as well. Because it extends the
demands of the establishment clause to the very point at which
they abut the limitations of the free exercise clause, the test of
falsifiability avoids authorizing accommodations to religion
which lack constitutional warrant.
The difference in the border between the religion clauses
as defined by existing law and the test of falsifiability, respectively, can be seen in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos." 6
The lead plaintiff and appellee, one Mayson, was a building
engineer who worked in a gymnasium open to the public. The
non-profit organizations that owned and operated the gymnasium were affiliated with the Mormon church. Regardless of
the fact that Mayson's work had nothing to do with the beliefs
or practices of the church, and regardless of the fact that he
did not actually work for the church, Mayson was fired for not
being a member of the church.2 7
In short, an ordinary
employer imposed a test of piety as a condition of employment,
seemingly discriminating on the basis of religion in violation of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.27

However, the employer's action was authorized by § 702 of
the Act. 9 Prior to 1972, the Civil Rights Act exempted only
the religious activities of religious organizations from its ban
on religious discrimination in employment.28 ° In 1972, Con"entitlement" since it is neither universally available nor scarce and legitimately relied
upon. Consequently, it is not analogous to a common law interest and is not a
cognizable free exercise interest. See id. at 978-79.
276. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
277. Id. at 330.
278. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (1982).
279. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982).
280. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 702, 78 Stat. 255
(1964), as amended by Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
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gress extended that exemption to religious organizations' nonreligious, non-profit affiliates such as the gymnasium which
employed Mayson.2"' In Amos, the Court held that the
expanded exemption was a permissible accommodation of religion; that it did not violate the establishment clause, even
assuming that it was not required by the free exercise clause.
It is well established, too, that "[t]he limits of permissible
state accommodations to religion are by no means co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause." There is ample room under the Establishment
Clause for "benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without
28 2
interference."
Like the other descendants of Everson and Zorach, however,
the notion of "permissible state accommodations of religion" is
no more defensible than its forebearers. It is an amalgam of
incidental benefits for a putative religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. In theory, it has no basis
in the Constitution, and in practice, as in Amos, it leads to the
violation of conscience.
Under the test of falsifiability, the original, core exemption for religious activities contained in the Civil Rights Act
would survive scrutiny. A church must sometimes impose religious tests for employment; for example, in determining whom
it will permit to serve as a priest. Had the Act not provided
this core exemption, it probably would have infringed on free
exercise. 21183 The test of falsifiability, consequently, would not
have struck down the original exemption.
The 1972 expansion of the exemption, however, was not
required by the free exercise clause. In United States v. Lee, 284
the Court held that an Amish farmer who employed other
members of his sect was not exempt from the obligation to
withhold and pay social security taxes. The tax code provided
an exemption on religious grounds for self-employed individu281. Id.
282. 483 U.S. at 334 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970)).
283. Failure to exempt those positions, the qualifications for which are defined
directly by religious doctrine, would force the same impermissible dilemma
condemned in Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobble. See Bagni, Discriminationin the Name
of the Lord A Critical Evaluation of Discriminationby Religious Organizations,79
COLUM. L. REV. 1514 (1979).
284. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
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als.28 The Court held, however, that a further exemption for
employees who profess religion was not required by the free
exercise clause. While the law did burden religious belief, that
burden was justified by a compelling state interest in the fiscal
integrity of the Social Security system. 8 6
Congress and the courts have been sensitive to the needs
flowing from the Free Exercise Clause, but every person
cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident to exercising every aspect of the right to practice religious beliefs.
When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial
activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their
own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be
superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on
others in that activity.28 7
By the same reasoning, the 1972 exemption in the Civil
Rights Act was not required by the free exercise clause. The
government's interest in eliminating discrimination on religious grounds is at least as compelling as the fiscal interest at
issue in Lee. Like the Amish in Lee, the Mormons in Amos
had entered into ordinary commercial activity and were therefore subject to the same burdens as other commercial enterprises; in this case, the obligation to eliminate religious
discrimination.
Once free of the limitation imposed by the free exercise
clause, the test of falsifiability would invalidate the 1972
exemption. Religious tests for employment provide the
employer with the luxury of like-minded underlings, but they
also coerce conscience, forcing workers to conform for the sake
of earning a livelihood.2 88 Consequently, legislation which
grants an ordinary employer a license to impose faith as a condition of employment has the impermissible effect of advanc285. 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g) (1982).
286. 455 U.S. at 256-60.

287. Id. at 261.
288. The contrast with Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie is striking. While in those

cases the Court condemned the state's forcing
a livelihood, the Court in Amos was willing
unconscionable choice on non-believers. The
notion that the establishment clause allows

employees to choose between belief and
to permit employers to force the same
contradiction follows directly from the
ill-defined accommodations of religion.

The "accommodation" recognized in Amos was the freedom to discriminate against
non-believers. The test of falsifiability treats Amos in a manner consistent with

Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie because it permits, under the establishment clause, only
that religious discrimination which is required by the free exercise clause.
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ing belief not falsifiable in principle. As such, it is invalid
under the establishment clause.
The standards of the free exercise clause are not them-

selves free from difficulty. 28 9 By permitting them to define the

border between the clauses, the analysis I have proposed may
leave that border in an uncertain, wavering state. It recalls an
analogy drawn by Justice Jackson, concurring in McCollum.
If with no surer legal guidance we are to take up and decide
every variation of this controversy. . . we are likely to make
the legal "wall of separation between church and state" as
winding as the famous serpentine wall designed by Mr. Jef290
ferson for the University he founded.

As matters stand, however, the boundary between the clauses
is not a wall at all, but a wide, unmarked no-man's land. If the
analysis proposed here establishes even a serpentine wall
between the clauses-and between church and state-at least
the curves are familiar and reasonably constant.
D.

Improving on the "No Endorsement" Test

Consider the test of falsifiability as it applies to Marsh v.
289. The difficulties are well summarized by Lupu.

In deciding the burden

question, the court must inquire into sincerity, an act which "cannot escape the
distinctly bad aroma of an inquisition." Lupu, supra note 274, at 954. It must decide
whether the beliefs are religious, but with no reliable definition. Id. at 957-58. Courts
have also gauged the degree to which a central, as opposed to an incidental, aspect of
the religion is burdened, without a clear defense or standard of centrality. Id. at 95859.
In deciding whether a burden can be justified, there arise the interlocking
problems of identifying government ends, evaluating the impact of accommodation on
those ends, and fashioning a remedy that can actually achieve the accommodation. Id.
at 949-53. See also Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an
Appraisal of Recent Developments, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943 (1987); Garvey, Free
Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L. REV. 779 (1986); Note,
Religious Exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing
Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350 (1980).
Not surprisingly, given the doctrinal difficulties, particular cases reach
inconsistent results. For example, Professor Marshall argues that Yoder and Lee are
inconsistent because the state interest in secondary education is at least as compelling
as the interest in taxation. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free
Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545, 549 (1983). This is debatable, since
secondary education could not be funded without a sound tax system, but the general
point is well taken.
Whatever the difficulties, however, the free exercise clause would surely preclude
the parade of horribles advanced in Everson and, generally, adequately protect
religious liberty without the need for unfounded accommodations under the
establishment clause. I claim no more than that.
290. 333 U.S. 203, 238 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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Chambers,"' in which the Court upheld Nebraska's practice of
opening sessions of the legislature with a prayer. The legislative prayer may be merely a traditional ritual.2 92 It may even
be an empty ritual. Nevertheless, the practice places the prestige of the state in the service of prayer. The legislature's
praying implies that prayer is effective; an implication which
serves to strengthen the complex of non-falsifiable beliefs on
which both the practice and the expectation of prayer are
founded. Because the state illegitimately advances belief not
falsifiable in principle by engaging in the practice legislative
prayer is inconsistent with the establishment clause.
Another way to state my objection to the legislative prayer
would be to say that the practice improperly "endorses" religion. I have chosen not to use that term so as to avoid confusion with Justice O'Connor's approach to establishment clause
questions.29 3 It is important to avoid that confusion because the
Justice's "no endorsement" test and the test proposed here are
quite different.2 9 4 In a recent article, Steven Smith has dissected the "no endorsement" test, pointing out some of its critical weaknesses. 29 5 Despite the apparent similarities between
the "no endorsement" test and the test of falsifiability, the latter escapes Smith's most damaging objections.2 96
Smith objects first that the central term of Justice
O'Connor's

approach-"endorsement"-is

ambiguous. 29 7

He

articulates four different senses in which governmental action
291. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
292. 463 U.S. at 783.
293. See Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day

Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Estate of Thornton
v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 711-12 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Wallace v.

Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67-84 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 688-92 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
294. It is especially important to make the distinction in view of the Court's
increasing reliance on the "no endorsement" test. See Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 109
S. Ct. 890, 896 (1989); County of Allegheny v. A.C.L.U., 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3103, 3107
(1989); id., at 3017-3124 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 3124 (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
295. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266 (1987).
296. Some of Smith's objections to the "no endorsement" test are simply not
relevant to the test of falsifiability. For example, Justice O'Connor would condemn
legislation backed by an "intent to endorse." Smith attacks the very possibility of
determining such an intent. Id. at 283-91. The test of falsifiability has no purpose or
intent component, for reasons stated at the outset of this Article. See supra text
accompanying note 32.
297. Smith, supra note 295, at 276-78.
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might endorse religion, from proclaiming one true religion to
acknowledging that some citizens are in fact religious. 29s
These different senses of "endorsement" imply standards of
varying severity, adding to the general confusion in the area.2 9 9
Simply prohibiting all forms of endorsement is only one possibility among many, and is not the standard Justice O'Connor
likely had in mind. The test of falsifiability, on the other hand,
has at least the virtue of being unequivocal on this point: anything which places the prestige of the state in the service of
belief not falsifiable in principle is invalid.
The most likely interpretation of Justice O'Connor's standard is "one which permits governmental accommodation of
religion but forbids all other forms of endorsement, including
exclusive preferment and endorsements of truthfulness or
value."'' "° This standard, however, suffers from a fatal defect.
It assumes that "accommodation" and "endorsement" are
mutually exclusive. In fact, they are complementary; governmental action can easily be both an accommodation and an
endorsement.3 0 '
The test of falsifiability does not suffer from the same
defect. Justice O'Connor's need to distinguish between
"accommodations" and "endorsements" arises from her willingness to accept a gap between the religion clauses in which
governmental benefits to religion which are not actually
required by the free exercise clause are permitted. The test of
falsifiability, in contrast, rejects altogether the validity of such
religious accommodations. The test treats the religion clauses
as sharing a single, common border: one permits only what the
other requires. As a consequence, it escapes all forms of the
boundary-drawing problem of which the Justice's accommodation/endorsement difficulty is an instance. The test of falsifiability condemns both sorts of benefit to religion.
Smith also points out that condemning legislation which
creates a perception of endorsement supposes an ideal perceiver. Such a construct, however, will perceive just those
endorsements which the person applying the test wishes it to
perceive. 3°2 The perception prong, as a consequence, lacks
298. Id. at 276-77.
299. Id. at 277-78.

300. Id. at 279.
301. Id. at 281-82.
302. Id. at 292.
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objectivity and reliability.3 0 3 The test of falsifiability, on the

other hand, has no such indeterminate element. The foundation of the test is the notion of falsifiability in principle. The
test thus turns on the logical form of propositions as they
appear in the text of legislation and in the legislation's implementation. Although, as I have acknowledged above, applying
the test will in many cases raise questions of fact,30 4 the test of
falsifiability does have an advantage over the "no endorsement" test in terms of objectivity.
The object of Justice O'Connor's test is to ensure that
one's religion is never "relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community.13 0

Smith argues that there is

no logical connection between endorsements in legislation and
political standing.3 0 6 Were clergy prohibited from serving in
the legislature the ban would affect their political standing, but
such a prohibition could be interpreted as either approving or
disapproving of religion. 0 7 Conversely, some unequivocal
endorsements of religion-"In God We Trust" on coins-have
no practical effect whatever on persons' political standing, if by
that we mean substantive civil rights. 0 8
The test of falsifiability escapes this objection because it
turns on violations of conscience rather than the diminution of
political standing. Using coins proclaiming "In God We Trust"
is not a debilitating violation of conscience, but it is a violation
of constitutional dimension. A violation of fundamental principle is the same on any scale, as the Court has recognized in
holding that one may not be compelled to bear the legend
"Live Free or Die" on one's license plates3 " or to pledge allegiance to a graven image.3 10
Finally, Smith argues that Justice O'Connor's test cannot
303. Id. at 293. On a similar note, Smith notes that, by focusing on the perception
of endorsements of religion, O'Connor exacerbates the problem of defining religion
generally. Almost any government action could be seen by some person as endorsing
what he thinks of as religion. The definitional problem is thus incorporated into the
heart of the "no endorsement" test. Since the test of falsifiability does not turn on
perceptions, it does not share this particular defect. However, defining religion
generally is an issue in any test under the establishment clause. I address it with
regard to the test of falsifiability. See supra text accompanying notes 259-65.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 245-51.

305. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
306. Smith, supra note 295, at 306.
307. Id. at 306-07.

308. Id. at 307.
309. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
310. West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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be supported by arguing that governmental endorsements of
religion alienate citizens who do not hold the religious convictions endorsed. 31 ' Professor Tushnet's reaction to the Lynch
opinion is an example of such alienation.3 1 2 As my use of that
example above might indicate, the "no alienation" interpretation of the "no endorsement" test brings it closer to my argument based on freedom of conscience. Consequently, Smith's
argument on this point is more threatening to the test of falsifiability, and deserves close scrutiny.
Smith points out that government necessarily expresses
judgments on matters of belief and that, regardless of which
judgment it makes, government will offend some citizen's
sensibilities.
Once again, Lynch is illustrative: Whether the creche was
included in or removed from the Christmas display, the sincere religious sensibilities of some citizens would be
offended. Cogent or not, the polemics of what maybe called
the "religions right" provide powerful evidence of the alienation and frustration generated by the Supreme Court decisions that have excluded religious practices from areas of
public life, such as the schools, and that have established, in
the view of some religious believers, an antireligious "secular
3 13
humanism."
Thus, avoiding alienation cannot serve as a justification for
condemning endorsements, since removing the endorsement
may itself cause alienation.
The test of falsifiability escapes this objection by providing
a coherent distinction between the alienation felt by those who
share the convictions the creche advanced and those who do
not. To put it bluntly, the alienation Christians might feel in
response to being refused a state-sponsored creche does not
count as a violation of conscience entitled to protection under
the establishment clause. Under the test of falsifiability, the
city's refusal to pay for a creche, or the Court's refusal to permit it to do so, is not action which advances belief not falsifiable in principle.

Now, to say that the disquietude Christians might feel on
the removal of Pawtucket's creche is not a violation of conscience deserving of constitutional protection may sound like
311. Smith, supra note 295, at 309-13.
312. See supra text accompanying note 254.
313. Smith, supra note 295, at 311.
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hostility toward religion. It is not. Under the test of falsifiability, the free exercise clause is granted priority in order
14
to eliminate genuine infringements of religious liberty.'
Beyond that, however, there is no reason to suppose that the
establishment clause will treat religion and other sorts of
belief similarly in all circumstances. Religion and science, for
example, differ fundamentally in their stance toward ultimate
truth and, as a consequence, in their status under the deontological Constitution. So, too, do the Virgin and the Magi and
Santa and his reindeer.
E.

Reordering the Cases

The test of falsifiability embodies an abhorrence of indoctrination which, as Bowen indicates, is a deep constant in the
cases. That constant has not effected consensus in the establishment clause cases, however, because Everson and Zorach
have exerted a contrary and more powerful influence. The
3 15
result has been a deep rift in establishment clause doctrine.
The test of falsifiability resolves the conflict by permitting the
Engel and Abington line to trump Everson and Zorach's progeny. In many cases, this consists of rationalizing the ad hoc
distinctions the Court has already made in its attempts to cope
with the endemic conflict. In other specific conflicts, reconciliation amounts to nothing but express recognition that the
Engel and Abington line should dominate because it has a
coherent rationale which the Everson and Zorach side lacks.
Consider the notorious conflict between Allen on the one
316 The latter cases
hand and Meek and Wolman on the other.
mark the Court's realization that the "incidental benefits" theory of Everson opens the door to virtually unlimited governmental aid to religion. If the state may provide material
assistance to parochial schools so long as the objects themselves have no religious indicia-Allen's standard-the state is
free to supply parochial schools with virtually every necessity,
on the ground that those necessities provide only "incidental
benefits" to religion.
The Court drew the line in Wolman.
314. The Christians' demand that the city sponsor the creche certainly would not
fall within the requirements of the free exercise clause. Under the test of falsifiability,
however, there is no other ground for the state's extending benefits to religion. There
is no such thing as a permissible accommodation.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 89-111.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 38-52 & 80.
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It has been argued that the court should extend Allen to
cover all items similar to textbooks. See Meek, 421 U.S. at
385 (Burger, C.J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); id., at 390-91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part). When faced, however, with a choice between extension of the unique presumption created in Allen and continued adherence to the
principles announced in our subsequent cases, we choose the
latter course.3 17
What the Court did not say was that the "principles announced
in our subsequent cases" were those of Engel and Abington as
reiterated in Meek: the fear of a "first experiment" prompted
by an abhorrence of indoctrination.
For example, Meek invalidated state programs lending
instructional materials to parochial schools on terms which
could not be plausibly distinguished from the lending of
schoolbooks approved in Allen.318 In a passage later quoted in
Wolman, Justice Stewart wrote that:
The church-related elementary and secondary schools that
are the primary beneficiaries of Act 195's instructional material and equipment loans typify such religion-pervasive institutions. The very purpose of many of those schools is to
provide an integrated secular and religious education; the
teaching process is, to a large extent, devoted to the inculcation of religious values and belief. Substantial aid to the
educational function of such schools, accordingly, necessarily
results in aid to the sectarian school enterprise as a whole.3 19
In other words, the ground for barring the lending of instructional materials in Meek was the Court's fear that the state aid
would, directly or indirectly, advance belief not falsifiable in
principle. What kept the Court from extending Allen-as
Everson permitted and encouraged it to do-was the same concern for freedom of conscience that animates the "first experiment" cases.
317. 433 U.S. at 251-252 n.18.
318. See Meek, 421 U.S. at 362-63. Justice Stewart stresses that the instructional
materials were provided directly to parochial schools, while the books
were provided
to students. Aside from being a transparent fiction, the distinction between
direct and

indirect assistance had been rejected two years earlier in Committee for Pub. Educ.
and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 781, 786-87 (1973). Justice Stewart's
distinction also rests on the flawed premises of Everson's "incidental benefits" theory.
See supra text accompanying notes 27-57.
319. Meek, 421 U.S. at 366 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). See Wolman, 433
U.S. at 229-30.
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In Wolman, the influence of Engel and Abington in limiting Allen is even more conspicuous. In addition to invalidating
an instructional materials lending program, the Wolman Court
overturned Ohio's program providing transportation for paro32
chial school field trips.

0

[A]lthough a trip may be to a location that would be of interest to those in public schools, it is the individual teacher who
makes a field trip meaningful. The experience begins with
the study and discussion of the place to be visited; it continues on location with the teacher pointing out items of interest and stimulating the imagination; and it ends with a
discussion of the experience. The field trips are an integral
part of the educational experience, and where the teacher
works within and for a sectarian institution, an unacceptable
3 21
risk of fostering of religion is an inevitable byproduct.
Field trips may be devoted to religious education, whatever the
ostensibly secular destination. Consequently, the transportation program was invalid because it presented a danger of the
state's advancing belief not falsifiable in principle.
Neither Meek nor Wolman, however, marked a final
break with Everson or addressed the question of conscience as
forthrightly as the test of falsifiability would. Books on secular
subjects are indistinguishable from field trips to secular destinations in the ease with which they can be diverted to sectarian uses. Yet both Meek and Wolman upheld book lending
programs and refused to overrule Allen.3 22 Engel and Abington's concern for freedom of conscience, never a prominent
establishment clause value, served only to limit Allen. The test
of falsifiability would make this constitutional value explicit,
give Engel and Abington their due and overrule Allen
altogether.
Failing to give Engel and Abington due consideration is at
the root of other charges of inconsistency. Consider Justice
Rehnquist's apparent contention that Wolman is inconsistent
in permitting speech and hearing services to take place in the
parochial school, vhile requiring that guidance counseling
should take place off premises.323 The Wolman majority's
rationale for such a distinction could not be more clear.
320. 433 U.S. at 252-55.
321. Id. at 253-54 (citing Meek, 421 U.S. at 366).
322. Meek, 421 U.S. at 359-62; Wolman, 433 U.S. at 236-38.
323. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 111 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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The reason for considering diagnostic services to be different
from teaching or counseling is readily apparent. First, diagnostic services, unlike teaching or counseling, have little or
no educational content and are not closely associated with
the educational mission of the nonpublic school. Accordingly, any pressure on the public diagnostician to allow the
intrusion of sectarian views is greatly reduced. Second, the
diagnostician has only limited contact with the child, and
that contact involves chiefly the use of objective and professional testing methods to detect students in need of treatment. The nature of the relationship between the
diagnostician and the pupil does not provide the same opportunity for the transmission of sectarian views as attends the
relationship between teacher and student or that between
324
counselor and student.
Justice Rehnquist's reluctance to acknowledge this distinction
is rooted in his reluctance to acknowledge the establishment
clause value on which it depends.
Similarly, the inconsistency between Levitt and Regan
alleged by Justice Rehnquist is wholly illusory. 25 By funding
teacher-prepared tests, as it had in Levitt, New York ran the
risk of subsidizing religious education: tests prepared by parochial school teachers clearly might test for, and thereby
advance, religious beliefs. "We cannot ignore the substantial
risk that these examinations, prepared by teachers under the
authority of religious institutions, will be drafted with an eye,
unconsciously or otherwise, to inculcate students in the religious precepts of the sponsoring church. '32 6 New York revised
the law to limit the reimbursement program to state-prepared
tests, the content of which obviously was not under parochial
school control.3 27 In so doing, the state eliminated the possibil324. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 244.
325. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 111 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
In Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, the Court invalidated a New
York
program of reimbursement for teacher-prepared tests on secular subjects,
expressly
rejecting the argument that, since the state required the subjects to be
taught, the
state could pay the expenses associated with teaching the subjects.
Levitt v.
Committee for Public Education, 413 U.S. 472 (1973). After Levitt, New
York revised
its legislation so that parochial schools were reimbursed only for
the cost of
administering state prepared tests; reimbursements for teacher-prepared
tests were
eliminated. Act of May 23, 1974, ch. 507, 1974 N.Y. Laws, as amended by ch.
508, N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § 3601 (McKinney 1981).
326. 413 U.S. at 480.
327. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646, 65051 (1980).
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ity that it would subsidize the inculcation of religious belief.
As in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 240, "[t]he nonpublic
school does not control the content of the test or its result";
and here, as in Wolman, this factor "serves to prevent the
use of the test as a part of religious teaching," ibid., thus
avoiding the kind of direct aid forbidden by the Court's prior
cases. The District Court was correct in concluding that
could be
there was no substantial risk that the examinations
3 28
purposes.
educational
religious
used for
New York's restriction on the program struck down in Levitt
satisfied the Court in Regan because it satisfied the Court's
concern over freedom of conscience. The cases appear to conflict only if one ignores the role of that constitutional value.
Justice Rehnquist's objection to Wolman's permitting
speech and hearing diagnostic services to be provided on school
premises, while simultaneously requiring therapy to take place
off school premises, rests on the same willful disregard of the
3 29
The same can be said of Professor
Engel and Abington line.
Choper's argument that Meek erred in barring health services
in the parochial school in light of Wolman's permitting speech
33°
The
and hearing diagnostic services to be provided close by.
with
concern
their
for
rationale
a
Wolman majority offered
place; of course its prominent critics simply refuse to take it at
face value. On the point in question, Wolman merely followed
Meek in addressing Engel and Abington's concern with
conscience.
We recognize that, unlike the diagnostician, the therapist
may establish a relationship with the pupil in which there
might be opportunities to transmit ideological views. In
Meek the Court acknowledged the danger that publicly
employed personnel who provide services analogous to those
at issue here might transmit religious instruction and
advance religious beliefs in their activities. But, . . . the
Court emphasized that this danger arose from the fact that
the services were performed in the pervasively sectarian
So long as
atmosphere of the church-related school ....
328. Id. at 656.
329. In his Wallace v. Jaffree dissent, Justice Rehnquist argues that the opinion in
Wolman is inconsistent in permitting speech and hearing diagnostic services to be

provided on school premises, while simultaneously requiring therapeutic speech and
hearing services to be provided off school premises.. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 111
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

330. See supra note 83.
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these types of services are offered at truly religiously neutral
locations, the danger perceived in Meek does not arise.3 3 '

The danger perceived in Meek was the same as that perceived
in Engel and Abington: the danger of indoctrination.
To be sure, auxiliary services personnel, because not
employed by the nonpublic schools, are not directly subject
to the discipline of a religious authority. But they are performing important educational services in schools in which
education is an integral part of the dominant sectarian mission and in which an atmosphere of religious belief is constantly maintained.
The potential for impermissible
fostering of religion under these circumstances, although
332
somewhat reduced, is nonetheless present.
The reluctance of Rehnquist and Choper to take Wolman at
its word regarding location is attributable primarily to a tolerance of indoctrination at odds with Engel and Abington. Not
surprisingly, it is completely consistent with the preference for
Everson and Zorach which Justice Rehnquist displayed in
333
Mueller.
While in cases like Wolman and Regan, the test of falsifiability rationalizes the Court's ad hoc distinctions, it
resolves most conflicts in the cases under the clause simply by
indicating a clear preference of one case over the other.
For example, Justice Rehnquist's contention that Wolman's holding on bus transportation contradicts Everson 334
may be correct on its face, but by now the resolution of that
conflict should be obvious. Everson's premises are hollow,
while Wolman's holding on transportation is rooted in the genuine constitutional value of freedom of conscience. Engel and
Abington's abhorrence of indoctrination would trump Everson's empty "incidental benefits" theory simply because the
latter, but not the former, has a coherent constitutional
rationale.
The test of falsifiability would reconcile the sharp conflict
331. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 247.
332. Meek, 421 U.S. at 371-72 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

333. See supra text accompanying notes 94-99. Justice Rehnquist also makes a
trivial objection to Wolman's upholding the provision of speech and hearing services
on parochial school premises in light of Meek's striking down an identical program.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 111 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As the Wolman opinion
clearly states, the program in Meek was struck down only because it was not severable.
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 244; Meek, 421 U.S. at 371 n.21.
334. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 111 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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3 5 In
between McGowan and Thornton in the latter's favor.
Thornton, the Court held that Connecticut could not require
employers to provide a day of rest on any day declared by an
employee to be his Sabbath.136 The opinion clearly states the
roots of the establishment clause in the categorical imperative,
in quoting Learned Hand to the effect that: "The First
Amendment... gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit
of their own interests others must conform their conduct to his
own religious necessities. 3 3 7 The majority's distaste for
enforced conformity to the dictates of another's conscience is
palpable in its description of the statutes:

In essence, the Connecticut statute imposes on employers
and employees an absolute duty to conform their business
practices to the particular religious practices of the employee
by enforcing observance of the Sabbath the employee unilaterally designates. The state thus commands that Sabbath
religious concerns automatically control over all secular
interests at the workplace; the statute takes no account of
the convenience or interests of the employer or those of
other employees who do not observe a Sabbath. The
employer and others must adjust their affairs to the command of the state whenever the statute is invoked by the
employee.3 38
McGowan clearly cannot withstand such scrutiny. Thornton
condemns the Connecticut law particularly on the ground that:
"the statute provides for no special consideration if a high percentage of an employer's workforce asserts rights to the same
Sabbath.

339

McGowan, in contrast, permitted Maryland to

declare the majority religion's Sabbath a Sabbath for virtually
the entire work force. 4 0 Both Thornton and the test of falsifiability indicate a contrary result in McGowan because, by
forcing the owners of businesses to close on a particular day,
Maryland's Sunday closing laws advanced the majority's conviction that that day is sacred.
Nyquist and Mueller are inconsistent, as I have noted,
because the latter upheld Minnesota's system of tax deductions
335. See supra note 87.

336. 472 U.S. at 710-11.
337. Id. at 710 (quoting Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir.
1953)).
338. Id. at 709.
339. Id.
340. 366 U.S. at 447-49.
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to parochial school parents on a ground the former had
expressly rejected: that the parent's intervening decision concerning how to spend the money provided by the state cured
any objection that the state had aided parochial schools. 4
Justice Rehnquist recognized this contradiction, but used Everson to escape it:
[T]his case is vitally different from the scheme struck down
in Nyquist. There, public assistance amounting to tuition
grants was provided only to parents of children in nonpublic
schools. This fact had considerable bearing on our decision
striking down the New York statute at issue; we explicitly
distinguished both Allen and Everson on the grounds that
"[iun both cases the class of beneficiaries included all schoolchildren, those in public as well as those in private
342
schools."
The benefit provided in Mueller was an "incidental benefit,"
where that provided in Nyquist was not. The former therefore
did not violate the clause, though the latter did.
What is missing from this tidy analysis is the element
omitted from Everson forty years ago: a plausible explanation
of why a benefit's being incidental renders it innocuous.3 4 3
While a benefit's being incidental might indicate the legislature had no invidious purpose, proper purpose alone cannot be
dispositive. The focus of analysis under the clause must be on
the interests the clause protects and the effect of challenged
legislation on those interests. Purpose is relevant only insofar
as it indicates likely effects. If legislation provides a benefit to
religion in a manner inimical to interests protected by the
clause, the benefit's being "incidental" does not attenuate that
harm, or legitimize the legislation under the clause. Everson is
hollow, and so is Justice Rehnquist's distinction between Mueller and Nyquist. While the Nyquist opinion also relies too
heavily on Everson, its result at least is defensible under the
test of falsifiability. 3 4
The test disposes of the cases afflicted by Zorach in a similar fashion. In a series of paired cases, the Court appears to
have validated the greater benefit to religion and struck down
341. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 786
(1973); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983). See supra text accompanying notes

49-54.

342. 463 U.S. at 398 (citation omitted).
343. See supra text accompanying notes 27-47.
344. See infra text accompanying notes 347-48.
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the lesser. 345 The source of the difficulty is Zorach's posing an
unanswerable question of uncalibrated degree: How much
does the challenged legislation advance the likelihood of an
established church?" 4 The test of falsifiability is more precise
and less subject to outright abuse. It resolves the paired inconsistencies by striking down benefits to religion, great and
small, incidental or not, as first experiments on our liberties.
In the first of these pairs, the conflict between Walz and
Nyquist would be resolved in favor of the latter. 34 7 Small tax
credits and grants to parents of parochial school students
clearly advance belief not falsifiable in principle simply by
making it possible for children to attend schools where such
instruction takes place. The much larger real estate tax
exemptions granted directly to churches in Walz obviously
have the same illegitimate effect on a much larger scale.
Nyquist survives under the test of falsifiability; Walz clearly
does not.
The same analysis indicates a preference for Nyquist over
Tilton.'
Under the test's proposed definition, enhancing the
financial stability of a sectarian college-however incidentally-by contributing to its building fund is indistinguishable
from providing for the maintenance and repair of parochial
schools. Regardless of the other functions those institutions
perform, they are devoted to advancing belief not falsifiable in
principle. As such, they are not proper objects of governmental assistance.
The inconsistency between Lemon, Mueller and Allen also
dissolves once we have a rationale for preferring one case over
another. 349 Lemon's striking down reimbursements to parochial schools for the cost of textbooks and instructional materials would be dictated by the test of falsifiability, since the
benefit clearly would keep parochial schools viable. However
desirable such schools may be in general, it is not a proper
function of a constitutional government with deontological
premises to advance the teleological programs of religion in
any fashion, to any degree. To the extent Mueller's authorization of tax benefits to parochial school parents or Allen's lending textbooks to parochial schools is inconsistent with Lemon,
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

See supra text
See supra text
See supra text
See supra text
See supra text

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

notes 85-87.
notes 74-80.
note 85.
note 86.
note 88.
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the test of falsifiability would overrule the former cases. The
viability of parochial schools simply is not a proper object of
state power.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The neglect of freedom of conscience as an establishment
clause value has obscured not only the connection between the
clause and the Constitution but the nature of the Constitution
itself. The ruse of accommodations doctrine, untenable claims
of the establishment of secular humanism and the exploitation
of the confusion in the cases for the benefit of religion-all are
possible only because some relentlessly insist, and many
uncritically concede, that law and religion are natural partners
in the search for meaning and direction in life. The Constitution, however, reflects a deeper wisdom: that meaning and
direction are genuine and good when, in the exercise of conscience, one finds them freely in the family, the community or
the church; but that the hand of the state turns meaning into
mandate and direction into subjugation.
Like any strict construction of the establishment clause,
the test of falsifiability reflects that deeper wisdom by denying
religion the force of law. The particular method of the test of
falsifiability is to address the violation of conscience directly. It
invalidates laws which preclude dissent by putting the force of
law and the power of the state behind propositions which cannot be disproven. Legislation or executive action is invalid
under the establishment clause when it has the effect of
advancing belief not falsifiable in principle. Advancing such
belief means to put forward or inculcate such belief or to
strengthen or perpetuate such belief through the use of the
state's coercive or fiscal power. The only qualification to the
test is that it cannot, of course, infringe on rights protected
under the free exercise clause. The test of falsifiability does
not, however, cede to religion what is not actually required by
the free exercise clause. It treats accommodations as just
another name for unlawful establishments of religion.
In proposing the test of falsifiability, I have attempted
above all to place freedom of conscience at the center of establishment clause analysis. Unless that is done, the clause will
never protect individual dignity as well as it might.

